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Orthodox atomistic approaches to global problems makes extinction inevitable – we control causality of conflict

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Orthodox IR approaches: occluding systems, securitising crises, reifying violence 2.1 Disciplinary fragmentation Unfortunately, orthodox IR approaches are ill-equipped to understand the complexity of these interconnected global crises and their interdependent impacts on the international system. Generally, IR scholars have examined global crises as discrete phenomena. Economic and financial crises are studied within the discipline of International Political Economy, particularly with a view to understanding their structural causes and trajectories, sometimes including their impact on development, inequality and poverty. Energy depletion as a global systemic problem is rarely acknowledged in the IR literature, but when (rarely) acknowledged, it is largely viewed through the lens of energy policy as an arm of ‘national security’. Similarly, climate change is examined in the context of its strategic implications in exacerbating vulner- ability to violent conflict or scrutinised in the context of the scope for inter-state negotiations and global governance.54 For the most part, IR as a discipline has not fully acknowledged the real-world scale of these crises as inherently interdependent phenomena requiring an integrated and holistic theoretical appraisal. Many traditional neorealist scholars, of course, view environmental factors as of either minimal or negligible significance in identifying future security threats and explaining past, present or potential inter-state conflicts.55 Yet as evidence of climate change has become more disturbing, such perspectives have been increasingly contested. While some scholars tend to focus on the role of natural resource shortages or abundance in engendering conditions of anarchy and violence, others investigate the capacity or inability of states to negotiate viable cooperative international regulatory frameworks to prevent or respond to crises. As such, most theorists draw either implicitly or explicitly on neorealist or neoliberal assumptions about state behaviour in the international system, debilitating their ability to understand these crises precisely in their global systemic context. 2.2 Neorealism: tragedy as self-fulfilling prophecy In one salient example, O’Keefe draws extensively on both offensive and defensive variants of neorealist theory, including the work of Jack Snyder, Robert Jervis and Kenneth Waltz, to argue for realism’s continuing relevance in understanding how the ‘biophysical environment plays a significant role in triggering and prolonging the structural conditions that result in con- flict’. She notes that standard realist concepts such as ‘anarchy, security dilemmas, and the prison- er’s dilemma’ can be used to explain the emergence of environmental or resource-based violent conflicts largely within, and occasionally between, the weaker states of the South. ‘Environmental anarchy’ occurs in weak states which lack ‘active government regulation’ of the internal distri- bution of natural resources, leading to a ‘tragedy of the commons’. This generates resource scar- cities which lead to ‘security dilemmas’ over ownership of resources, often settled by resort to violence, perpetuated by ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’.56 Ultimately, this theoretical hypothesis on the causes of environmental or resource-related con- flict is incapable of engaging with the deeper intersecting global structural conditions generating resource scarcities, independently of insufficient government management of the internal distri- bution of resources in weak states. It simplistically applies the Hobbesian assumption that without a centralised ‘Leviathan’ state structure, the persistence of anarchy in itself generates con- flict over resources. Under the guise of restoring the significance of the biophysical environment to orthodox IR, this approach in effect actually occludes the environment as a meaningful causal factor, reducing it to a mere epiphenomenon of the dynamics of anarchy in the context of state failure. As a consequence, this approach is theoretically impotent in grasping the systemic accel- eration of global ecological, energy and economic crises as a direct consequence of the way in which the inter-state system itself exploits the biophysical environment. The same criticism in fact applies to opposing theories that resource abundance is a major cause of violent conflict. Bannon and Collier, for instance, argue that resource abundance and greed, rather than resource scarcity and political grievances, generated intra-state conflicts financed by the export of commodities in regions like Angola and Sierra Leone (diamonds) or West Africa (tropical timber). In other regions, abundance rather than shortages of oil, drugs and gold fuelled and financed violent secessionist movements in the context of widespread cor- ruption and poor governance.57 Ultimately, this departs little from the theoretical assumptions above, with weak central state governance still blamed for generating anarchic conditions conducive to conflict over abundant resources. Furthermore, as Kaldor shows, this simplistic per- spective overlooks the wider context of the global political economy – the evolution of regional ‘war economies’ was often enabled precisely by the devastating impact of neoliberal structural adjustment programmes, which eroded state structures and generated social crises that radicalised identity politics.58 Under traditional neorealist logic, a strategic response to global environmental crises must involve the expansion of state-military capabilities in order to strengthen the centralised govern- ance structures whose task is to regulate the international distribution of natural resources, as well as to ensure that a particular state’s own resource requirements are protected. Neorealism under- stands inter-state competition, rivalry and warfare as inevitable functions of states’ uncertainty about their own survival, arising from the anarchic structure of the international system. Gains for one state are losses for another, and each state’s attempt to maximise its power relative to all other states is simply a reflection of its rational pursuit of its own security. The upshot is the normalisation of political violence in the international system, including practices such as over-exploitation of energy and the environment, as a ‘rational’ strategy – even though this ulti- mately amplifies global systemic insecurity. Inability to cooperate internationally and for mutual benefit is viewed as an inevitable outcome of the simple, axiomatic existence of multiple states. The problem is that neorealism cannot explain in the first place the complex interdependence and escalation of global crises. Unable to situate these crises in the context of an international system that is not simply a set of states, but a transnational global structure based on a specific exploita- tive relationship with the biophysical environment, neorealism can only theorise global crises as ‘new issue areas’ appended to already existing security agendas.59 Yet by the very act of projecting global crises as security threats, neorealism renders itself powerless to prevent or mitigate them by theorising their root structural causes. In effect, despite its emphasis on the reasons why states seek security, neorealism’s approach to issues like climate change actually guarantees greater insecurity by promoting policies which frame these ‘non-traditional’ issues purely as amplifiers of quite traditional threats. As Susanne Peters argues, the neorealist approach renders the militarisation of foreign and domestic policy a pragmatic and necessary response to issues such as resource scarcities – yet, in doing so, it entails the inevitable escalation of ‘resource wars’ in the name of energy security. Practically, this serves not to increase security for competing state and non-state actors, but to debilitate inter- national security through the proliferation of violent conflict to access and control diminishing resources in the context of unpredictable complex emergencies.60 Neorealism thus negates its own theoretical utility and normative value. For if ‘security’ is the fundamental driver of state foreign policies, then why are states chronically incapable of effectively ameliorating the global systemic amplifiers of ‘insecurity’, despite the obvious rationale to do so in the name of warding off collective destruction, if not planetary annihilation?61 2.3 Neoliberalism: mutual over-exploitation as normative On the other hand, we have strategies of international cooperation to establish new global govern- ance regimes by which states can develop treaties and agreements to encourage mitigating action. It is now clear that the massive proliferation of international legal treaties designed to regulate activities impacting detrimentally on the environment and thus limit environmental degradation simply cannot be explained under the realist theoretical framework. While this seemingly vindi- cates neoliberal theoretical approaches which underscore the scope for rational state strategies of mutual cooperation,62 the latter are still at a loss to explain the extent to which ethical norms and values, national cultures and environmental and scientific advocacy underpin wide-ranging environmental regimes which cannot be reduced purely to state interests.63 Much of the liberal literature also explores the regressive dynamic of the energy industry and its international dimensions, though failing to escape realist assumptions about anarchy. Kaldor and her co-authors, for instance, note that conflicts can erupt in regions containing abundant resources when neopatrimonial states collapse due to competition between different ethnic and tribal factions motivated by the desire to control revenues.64 Similarly, Collier argues that the most impoverished populations inhabit the most resource-wealthy countries which, however, lack robust governance, encouraging rampant internal resource predation and therefore civil wars.65 Lack of robust governance thus facilitates not only internal anarchy over resource control, but also the illicit and corrupt activities of foreign companies, particularly in the energy sector, in exploiting these countries.66 This sort of analysis then leads to a staple set of normative prescriptions concerned largely with ways of inculcating ‘good governance’, such as transparency measures to avoid excessive secrecy under which oil companies indulge in corrup- tion; more robust international regulation; corporate social responsibility; and cosmopolitan prin- ciples such as democratisation, political equality and freedom of civil society.67 Yet such well-meaning recommendations often do not lead to sufficiently strong policy action by governments to rein in energy sector corruption.68 Furthermore, it is painfully clear from the examples of Kyoto, Copenhagen and Cancun that international cooperative state strategies con- tinue to be ineffective, with states unable to agree on the scale of the crises concerned, let alone on the policies required to address them. Indeed, while some modest successes were apparent in the Cancun Accord, its proposed voluntary emissions regime would still likely guarantee – according to even mid-range climate models – a global average temperature rise of 4°C or more, which would in turn culminate in many of the IPCC’s more catastrophic scenarios.69 This calls into question the efficacy of longstanding recommendations – such as Klare’s – that the international community develop unprecedented international mechanisms to coordinate the peaceful distribution of natural resources in the era of scarcity and environmental degradation.70 While at face value such regulatory governance mechanisms would appear essential to avoid violent conflict over depleting resources, they are posited in a socio-political and theoretical vacuum. Why is it that such potentially effective international mechanisms continue to be ignored? What are the socio-political obstacles to their implementation? Ultimately, the problem is that they overlook the structural and systemic causes of resource depletion and environmental degradation. Although neoliberalism shares neorealism’s assumptions about the centrality of the state as a unitary rational actor in the international system, it differs fundamentally in the notion that gains for one state do not automatically imply losses for another; therefore states are able to form coop- erative, interdependent relationships conducive to mutual power gains, which do not necessarily generate tensions or conflict.71 While neoliberalism therefore encourages international nego- tiations and global governance mechanisms for the resolution of global crises, it implicitly accepts the contemporary social, political and economic organisation of the international system as an unquestionable ‘given’, itself not subject to debate or reform.72 The focus is on developing the most optimal ways of maximising exploitation of the biophysi- cal environment. The role of global political economic structures (such as centralised private resource-ownership and deregulated markets) in both generating global systemic crises and inhi- biting effective means for their amelioration is neglected. As such, neoliberalism is axiomatically unable to view the biophysical environment in anything other than a rationalist, instrumentalist fashion, legitimising the over-exploitation of natural resources without limits, and inadvertently subordinating the ‘global commons’ to the competitive pressures of private sector profit-maximi- sation and market-driven solutions, rather than institutional reform.73 Mutual maximisation of power gains translates into the legitimisation of the unlimited exploitation of the biophysical environment without recognition of the human costs of doing so, which are technocratically projected merely as fixable aberrations from an optimal system of cooperative progress.74 Consequently, neoliberalism is powerless to interrogate how global political economic structures consistently undermine the establishment of effective environmental regimes. 2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity’s very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the poten- tially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of pro- jected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses. It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR’s insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the nor- mative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature’s overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes’ powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity. The extent of orthodox IR theory’s complicity in this predicament is evident in its reduction of inter-state relations to balance-of-power dynamics, despite a lack of determinate bases by which to define and delineate the dynamics of material power. While orthodox realism focuses inordinately on a military–political conceptualisation of national power, conventional attempts to extend this conceptualisation to include economic dimensions (including the role of transna- tional corporations) – as well as production, finance, ideas and institutions beyond the state – do not solve the problem.75 This Weberian proliferation of categorisations of the multiple dimen- sions of power, while useful, lacks a unifying explanatory order of determination capable of ren- dering their interconnections intelligible. As Rosenberg shows in his analysis of the dynamics of distinctive geopolitical orders from Rome to Spain – and Teschke in his exploration of the changing polities of continental Europe from the eighth to the eighteenth centuries – these orders have always been inseparably conjoined with their constitutive relations of production as structured in the context of prevailing social– property relations, illustrating the mutually-embedded nature of ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ power.76 In contrast, orthodox IR axiomatically fragments the ‘economic’ and ‘extra-economic’ (and the latter further into ‘military’, ‘political’, ‘cultural’, etc.) into separate, autonomous spheres with no grasp of the scope of their interconnection.77 It also dislocates both the state, and human existence as such, from their fundamental material conditions of existence, in the form of their relationship to the biophysical environment, as mediated through relations of production, and the way these are governed and contested through social–property relations.78 By externalising the biophysical environment – and thus human metabolism with nature – from state praxis, orthodox IR simply lacks the conceptual cat- egories necessary to recognise the extent to which socio-political organisational forms are mutually constituted by human embeddedness in the natural world.79 While further fragmenting the international into a multiplicity of disconnected state units whose behaviour can only be ana- lysed through the limited lenses of anarchy or hierarchy, orthodox IR is incapable of situating these units in the holistic context of the global political economy, the role of transnational capi- talist classes, and the structural pressures thereby exerted on human and state behaviour.80 Indeed, the mediating structure of the global political economy – along with the beliefs and behav- iour of agents within it (through which this structure is constructed) – play a critical role in the trans- formation of ecological or resource-related events into concrete politically-defined conditions of ‘scarcity’ that lead to crisis or conflict. A powerful example is provided by Davis in his study of the impact of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) – the vast oscillation in air mass and Pacific Ocean temperature. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, ENSO created large-scale droughts in many countries peripheral to the European empires, including those in Asia (India, China, Java, the Philippines and Korea), and in Brazil, southern Africa, Algeria and Morocco. Davis shows that British ‘free market’ imperial policy converted these droughts into foreseeable but preventable deadly famines, multiplying death tolls to gross proportions without any historical precedent.81 In 1874–76, northern harvests were more than sufficient to provide reserves for the 1878 autumn crops deficit. But most of the grain from north-western Indian subsistence farming was controlled by a captive export sector designed to stabilise British grain prices, which from 1876 to 1877 had increased due to poor harvests. This generated a British demand that absorbed almost the entirety of north-western India’s wheat surplus. Meanwhile, profits from these grain exports were monopolised by wealthy property holders, moneylenders and grain merchants, as opposed to poor Indian farmers. India’s newly-constructed modern railway system shipped grain from drought areas ‘to central depots for hoarding’, leading to exorbitant price hikes that were ‘co-ordinated in a thousand towns at once’. Food prices rocketed out of the reach of ‘out- caste labourers, displaced weavers, sharecroppers and poor peasants’. Consequently, ‘the poor began to starve to death even in well-watered districts “reputed to be immune to food shortages”’. Thus, between 1877 and 1878, grain merchants exported a record 6.4 million hundredweight of wheat to Europe while between 5.5 and 12 million Indians starved to death. This catastrophe occurred ‘not outside the modern world system, but in the very process of being forcibly incor- porated into its economic and political structures’.82 As Dalby thus argues, ‘humans live in a complex interaction with environments that adapt and change in much more complex ways than is facilitated by linear thinking within the territorial boxes of contemporary administrative arrangements’. This suggests ‘that “global” markets and economic connections are essential to understanding the complex politics of “local” environments and struggles over access to specific resources in particular places’ – because the ‘geography of the domination of nature’ is precisely the continuing ‘history of colonisation and imperialism’.83 Hence, environmental and energy crises are generated in the context of historically-specific socio- political systems – and whether or not they lead to conflict depends on existing relations of power at local, national and transnational scales, and on how those relations are configured by structures of resource ownership, mediated by ideas and values, and supported by military power. 3. From securitisation to militarisation 3.1 Complicity This analysis thus calls for a broader approach to environmental security based on retrieving the manner in which political actors construct discourses of 'scarcity' in response to ecological, energy and economic crises (critical security studies) in the context of the historically-specific socio-political and geopolitical relations of domination by which their power is constituted, and which are often implicated in the acceleration of these very crises (historical sociology and historical materialism). Instead, both realist and liberal orthodox IR approaches focus on different aspects of interstate behaviour, conflictual and cooperative respectively, but each lacks the capacity to grasp that the unsustainable trajectory of state and inter-state behaviour is only explicable in the context of a wider global system concurrently over-exploiting the biophysical environment in which it is embedded. They are, in other words, unable to address the relationship of the inter-state system itself to the biophysical environment as a key analytical category for understanding the acceleration of global crises. They simultaneously therefore cannot recognise the embeddedness of the economy in society and the concomitant politically-constituted nature of economics. Hence, they neglect the profound irrationality of collective state behaviour, which systematically erodes this relationship, globalising insecurity on a massive scale - in the very process of seeking security.85 In Cox's words, because positivist IR theory 'does not question the present order [it instead] has the effect of legitimising and reifying it'.86 Orthodox IR sanitises globally-destructive collective inter-state behaviour as a normal function of instrumental reason -thus rationalising what are clearly deeply irrational collective human actions that threaten to permanently erode state power and security by destroying the very conditions of human existence. Indeed, the prevalence of orthodox IR as a body of disciplinary beliefs, norms and prescriptions organically conjoined with actual policy-making in the international system highlights the extent to which both realism and liberalism are ideologically implicated in the acceleration of global systemic crises. By the same token, the incapacity to recognise and critically interrogate how prevailing social, political and economic structures are driving global crisis acceleration has led to the proliferation of symptom-led solutions focused on the expansion of state/regime military-political power rather than any attempt to transform root structural causes.88 It is in this context that, as the prospects for meaningful reform through inter-state cooperation appear increasingly nullified under the pressure of actors with a vested interest in sustaining prevailing geopolitical and economic structures, states have resorted progressively more to militarised responses designed to protect the concurrent structure of the international system from dangerous new threats. In effect, the failure of orthodox approaches to accurately diagnose global crises, directly accentuates a tendency to 'securitise' them - and this, ironically, fuels the proliferation of violent conflict and militarisation responsible for magnified global insecurity. 'Securitisation' refers to a 'speech act' - an act of labelling - whereby political authorities identify particular issues or incidents as an existential threat which, because of their extreme nature, justify going beyond the normal security measures that are within the rule of law. It thus legitimises resort to special extra-legal powers. By labelling issues a matter of 'security', therefore, states are able to move them outside the remit of democratic decision-making and into the realm of emergency powers, all in the name of survival itself. Far from representing a mere aberration from democratic state practice, this discloses a deeper 'dual' structure of the state in its institutionalisation of the capacity to mobilise extraordinary extra-legal military-police measures in purported response to an existential danger. The problem in the context of global ecological, economic and energy crises is that such levels of emergency mobilisation and militarisation have no positive impact on the very global crises generating 'new security challenges', and are thus entirely disproportionate.90 All that remains to examine is on the 'surface' of the international system (geopolitical competition, the balance of power, international regimes, globalisation and so on), phenomena which are dislocated from their structural causes by way of being unable to recognise the biophysically-embedded and politically-constituted social relations of which they are comprised. The consequence is that orthodox IR has no means of responding to global systemic crises other than to reduce them to their symptoms. Indeed, orthodox IR theory has largely responded to global systemic crises not with new theory, but with the expanded application of existing theory to 'new security challenges' such as 'low-intensity' intra-state conflicts; inequality and poverty; environmental degradation; international criminal activities including drugs and arms trafficking; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and international terrorism.91 Although the majority of such 'new security challenges' are non-military in origin - whether their referents are states or individuals - the inadequacy of systemic theoretical frameworks to diagnose them means they are primarily examined through the lenses of military-political power.92 In other words, the escalation of global ecological, energy and economic crises is recognised not as evidence that the current organisation of the global political economy is fundamentally unsustainable, requiring urgent transformation, but as vindicating the necessity for states to radicalise the exertion of their military-political capacities to maintain existing power structures, to keep the lid on.93 Global crises are thus viewed as amplifying factors that could mobilise the popular will in ways that challenge existing political and economic structures, which it is presumed (given that state power itself is constituted by these structures) deserve protection. This justifies the state's adoption of extra-legal measures outside the normal sphere of democratic politics. In the context of global crisis impacts, this counter-democratic trend-line can result in a growing propensity to problematise potentially recalcitrant populations - rationalising violence toward them as a control mechanism. Consequently, for the most part, the policy implications of orthodox IR approaches involve a redundant conceptualisation of global systemic crises purely as potential 'threat-multipliers' of traditional security issues such as 'political instability around the world, the collapse of governments and the creation of terrorist safe havens'. Climate change will serve to amplify the threat of international terrorism, particularly in regions with large populations and scarce resources. The US Army, for instance, depicts climate change as a 'stress-multiplier' that will 'exacerbate tensions' and 'complicate American foreign policy'; while the EU perceives it as a 'threat-multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability'.95 In practice, this generates an excessive preoccupation not with the causes of global crisis acceleration and how to ameliorate them through structural transformation, but with their purportedly inevitable impacts, and how to prepare for them by controlling problematic populations. Paradoxically, this 'securitisation' of global crises does not render us safer. Instead, by necessitating more violence, while inhibiting preventive action, it guarantees greater insecurity.

The alternative is to reject the 1AC – it adopts a critical approach to IR

Bilgin 5—Pinar Bilgin, Associate Professor of International Relations at Bilkent University (Turkey) [“Conclusion,” Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415325498, p. 205-207]

Emphasising the mutually interactive relationship between intellectuals and social movements should not be taken to suggest that the only way for intellectuals to make a change is to get directly involved in political action. They can also intervene by providing a critique of the existing situation, calling attention to what future outcomes may result if necessary action is not taken at present, and by pointing to potential for change immanent in regional politics. Students of security could help create the political space for alternative agents of security to take action by presenting appropriate critiques. It should be emphasised however that such thinking should be anchored in the potential immanent in world politics. The hope is that non-state actors (who may or may not be aware of their potential to make a change) may constitute themselves as agents of security when presented with an alternative reading of their situation. Thinking about the future becomes even more crucial once theory is [end page 205] conceptualised as constitutive of the ‘reality’ it seeks to respond to. In other words, our ideas about the future—our conjectures and prognoses—have a self-constitutive potential. What the students of Cold War Security Studies consider as a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future becomes ‘real’ through practice, albeit under circumstances inherited from the past. Thinking about what a ‘desired’ future would look like is significant for the very same reason; that is, in order to be able to turn it into a ‘reality’ through adopting emancipatory practices. For, having a vision of a ‘desired’ future empowers people(s) in the present. Presenting pictures of what a ‘desired’ future might look like, and pointing to the security community approach as the start of a path that could take us from an insecure past to a more secure future is not to suggest that the creation of a security community is the most likely outcome. On the contrary, the dynamics pointed to throughout the book indicate that there exists a potential for descent into chaos if no action is taken to prevent militarisation and fragmentation of societies, and the marginalisation of peoples as well as economies in an increasingly globalising world. However, these dynamics exist as ‘threats to the future’ to use Beck’s terminology; and only by thinking and writing about them that can one mobilise preventive action to be taken in the present. Viewed as such, critical approaches present not an ‘optimistic’, but a more ‘realistic’ picture of the future. Considering how the ‘realism’ of Cold War Security Studies failed not only when judged by its own standards, by failing to provide an adequate explanation of the world ‘out there’, but also when judged by the standards of critical approaches, as it was argued, it could be concluded that there is a need for more ‘realistic’ approaches to regional security in theory and practice. The foregoing suggests three broad conclusions. First, Cold War Security Studies did not present the ‘realistic’ picture it purported to provide. On the contrary, the pro-status quo leanings of the Cold War security discourse failed to allow for (let alone foresee) changes such as the end of the Cold War, dissolution of some states and integration of some others. Second, notwithstanding the important inroads critical approaches to security made in the post-Cold War era, much traditionalist thinking remains and maintains its grip over the security practices of many actors. Third, critical approaches offer a fuller or more adequate picture of security in different parts of the world (including the Middle East). Cold War Security Studies is limited not only because of its narrow (military-focused), pro-status quo and state-centric (if not statist) approach to security in theory and practice, but also because of its objectivist conception of theory and the theory/practice relationship that obscured the mutually constitutive relationship between them. Students of critical approaches have sought to challenge Cold War Security Studies, its claim to knowledge and its hold over security practices by pointing to the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice and revealing [end page 206] how the Cold War security discourse has been complicit in constituting (in)security in different parts of the world. The ways in which the Cold War security discourse helped constitute the ‘Middle East’ by way of representing it as a region, and contributed to regional insecurity in the Middle East by shaping security practices, is exemplary of the argument that ‘theories do not leave the world untouched’. The implication of these conclusions for practice is that becoming aware of the ‘politics behind the geographical specification of politics’ and exploring the relationship between (inventing) regions and (conceptions and practices of) security helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. An alternative approach to security, that of critical approaches to security, could inform alternative (emancipatory) practices thereby helping constitute a new region in the form of a security community. It should be noted, however, that to argue that ‘everything is socially constructed’ or that ‘all approaches have normative concerns embedded in them’ is a significant first step that does not by itself help one adopt emancipatory practices. As long as people rely on traditional practices shaped by the Cold War security discourse - which remains prevalent in the post-Cold War era - they help constitute a ‘reality’ in line with the tenets of ‘realist’ Cold War Security Studies. This is why seeking to address evolving crises through traditional practices whilst leaving a critical security perspective to be adopted for the long-term will not work. For, traditionalist thinking and practices, by helping shape the ‘reality’ ‘out there’, foreclose the political space necessary for emancipatory practices to be adopted by multiple actors at numerous levels. Hence the need for the adoption of a critical perspective that emphasises the roles human agency has played in the past and could play in the future in shaping what human beings choose to call ‘reality’. Generating such an awareness of the potentialities of human agency could enable one to begin thinking differently about regional security in different parts of the world whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors’ multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent(s) and how they think security should be sought in different parts of the world. After decades of statist, military-focused and zero-sum thinking and practices that privileged the security of some whilst marginalising the security of others, the time has come for all those interested in security in the Middle East to decide whether they want to be agents of a world view that produces more of the same, thereby contributing towards a ‘threat to the future’, or of alternative futures that try to address the multiple dimensions of regional insecurity. The choice is not one between presenting a more ‘optimistic’ or ‘pessimistic’ vision of the future, but between stumbling into the future expecting more of the same, or stepping into a future equipped with a perspective that not only has a conception of a ‘desired’ future but is also cognisant of ‘threats to the future’.

# 2

Interpretation – economic engagement must be conditional

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy. The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power. The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China. The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged. The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8 [To footnotes] 8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Violation – the aff is a unilateral giving – not a quid pro quo offer

Vote negative – quid pro quo gives competition for conditions cp and say no arguments. Key to fight back against aff bias

# 3

China-Mexico bilat increasing – we assume your collapse warrants

The Economist 6/6 – The Economist Magazine, (“Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?”, Article Written for The Economist, 6/6/13, <http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3>, AW)

In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the region’s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy prices have raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico and Costa Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States. This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probably not: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it does suggest that China’s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast.

Aff crowds out chinese trade – economic integration

Figueroa 12, Lee and Van Schoik, Research and Policy Analyst, Associatiate Director and Director at the North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2012

(Alejandro , Erik, and Rick “Realizing the Full Value of Crossborder Trade with Mexico,” North American Center for Transborder Studies, 2/9/2012)¶

Today more than 75,000 trucks (carrying close to 80 % of our two-way trade) cross our border on a daily basis. That this much traffic is able to cross our congested borders is due in part to important advances in border infrastructure in the last couple of years as new ports of entry have been opened. One important policy development is master planning processes for regional border infrastructure, which have been initiated in conjunction with local border communities and state governments. It is hoped that these regional processes will eventually make the overall binational infrastructure-building process more transparent, more robust and ultimately a better fit for two such powerful economies and next door neighbors. ¶ Much Opportunity, but the Real Work Has Only Just Begun ¶ Total trade between the United States and Mexico has expanded by more than 600% since 1990. Yet we need further commitment and investment in the infrastructure needed to sustain such growth, which is critical for both economies. The question now is whether our current border management system will be able to sustain that growth, and if so, for how much longer. A strong trade/joint production relationship with Mexico can help create high-quality jobs within our borders. ¶ For reasons of geography and history, Mexico’s fate is intertwined with that of the United States. And despite the current global economic environment, and transnational organized crime affecting Mexico and the United States, the two countries need to implement a 21st Century border that not only re-invigorates crossborder trade and economic integration but which will also lead to increased safety and quality of life for the residents of both countries. ¶ Both countries need to remain committed to promoting the global competitiveness of our region and to ensuring that the benefits of expanding trade flows keep reaching businesses, workers and consumers on both sides of our shared border. We will be able to accomplish this if leaders can explain the critical nature of our commercial relationships in ways that are more concrete and easier for citizens to understand. It is past time for our shared border to begin to meet tomorrow’s demands, acting as a facilitator and conductor of the lawful flows of goods, services and people between our nations, so that we may capitalize on the full potential of our partnership. If a billion dollars’ worth of trade crosses the U.S.-Mexico border on a daily basis and sustains six million jobs in the U.S., imagine what could be accomplished with a truly 21st century border.

Lack of US economic engagement spurs China’s growth.

Erikson & Chen ‘7 – (Daniel is a Senior Associate of US Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue. Janice is a degree candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. “China, Taiwan, and the Battle for Latin America,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 31:2, Summer 2007, pg. 71)

China’s economic engagement with Latin America responds to the requirements of a booming Chinese economy that has been growing at nearly 10 percent per year for the past quarter century. The economic figures are impressive: in the past six years, Chinese imports from Latin America have grown more than six-fold, at a pace of some 60 percent a year, to an estimated $60 billion in 2006. China has become a major consumer of food, mineral, and other primary products from Latin America, benefiting principally the commodity-producing countries of South America-par- ticularly Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Chinese investment in Latin America remains relatively small at some $6.5 billion through 2004, but that amount represents half of China's foreign investment overseas.9 China's Xinhua News agency reported that Chinese trade with the Caribbean ex- ceeded $2 billion in 2004, a 40 percent increase from the previous year.10 China has promised to increase its investments in Latin America to $100 billion by 2014, although government officials have since backed away from that pledge and several proposed investments are already showing signs of falling short in Brazil, Argentina, and elsewhere. For their part, Latin Americans are intrigued by the idea of China as a potential partner for trade and investment. As a rising superpower with- out a colonial or "imperialist" history in the Western Hemisphere, China is in many ways more politically attractive than either the United States or the European Union, especially for politicians confronted with constituen- cies that are increasingly anti-American and skeptical of Western inten- tions. 12 Nevertheless, most analysts recognize that Latin America's embrace of China-to the extent that this has actually occurred-is intimately linked to its perception of neglect and disinterest from the United States. Nervousness about Chinas rise runs deeper among the smaller economies such as those of Central America, which do not enjoy Brazil's or Argentina's abundance in export commodities and are inclined to view the competi- tion posed by the endless supply of cheap Chinese labor as a menace to their nascent manufacturing sectors. But even as China seeks to reassure the United States that its interests in South America are purely economic, Beijing has begun enlisting regional powers like Mexico to aid its effort to woo Central American diplomats. Pressure is also being placed on Paraguay by Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, its partners in the South American Common Market (Mercosur), which places certain constraints on member states' bilateral foreign policy prerogatives. Despite its avowals to Washington, China appears to be using its economic might as a means to achieve the patently political objective of stripping Taiwan of its democratic allies in the Western Hemisphere.

Collapse causes social unrest – results in great power war

Kane 01 – [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

# 4

Text: The Federal Government of Mexico should increase cooperative investment in land ports of entry.

That solves

Rama and Gardner 12 (Anahi Rama and Simon Gardner, writters for Reuters. 7/03/12. "Mexico's president-elect may double security spending: aide". Chicago Tribune. articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-03/news/sns-rt-us-mexico-election-securitybre86301s-20120703\_1\_enrique-pena-nieto-drug-violence-fight-drug)

MEXICO CITY (Reuters) - Mexico's President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto will seek to double security spending to around 2 percent of GDP to fight drug violence and organized crime while proposing new tactics to the United States, a top aide said on Tuesday.¶ Emilio Lozoya, touted as a possible pick for foreign minister, said Pena Nieto's administration would try to boost efforts to tackle money laundering and propose trans-border infrastructure projects to help create jobs, cut business costs and increase security.¶ Ads By Google¶ American exceptionalism:¶ Do the characteristics that made the US exceptional still apply?¶ www.aei.org/americanexceptionalism¶ Compare Medicare Plans¶ Medicare Advantage & Supp Plans. View All Plans & Prices Online.¶ www.MedicareSolutions.com¶ "Today Mexico is investing a bit less than 1 percent of gross domestic product (in security) which is low and clearly not enough to confront this problem," Lozoya told Reuters in an interview. "Investment on security needs to double at least."¶ He said U.S. financial aid, while welcome, was small in relation to Mexico's security spending, particularly "when the end consumer of narcotics is in the United States".¶ Pena Nieto proposes focusing efforts on projects that straddle the U.S.-Mexico border such as tunnels and high-tech border crossings, which would create jobs, boost security and promote economic development, Lozoya said

# 5

Fast Track fight is on the top of the agenda-Strong push from Obama is key-Failure collapses global trade momentum

Good-Farm Policy-12/31/13

The FarmPolicy.com News Summary

HEADLINE: Farm Bill; Ag Economy; and, Biofuels- Tuesday

And with respect to trade, the Chicago Tribune editorial board[18] noted yesterday that, 'President Barack Obama wants the power to negotiate free-trade treaties on a fast track. With Trade Promotion Authority, he would have a good chance of clinching huge trade pacts now being hammered out with Europe and Asia. Yet Congress may not give him that authority — for all the wrong reasons.' The Tribune opinion item stated that, 'Within months the White House hopes to finish talks on a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership with a group of Asia-Pacific nations. Talks with the European Union on the planned Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership are progressing too. Those deals would eliminate barriers and promote economic activity between the U.S. and key allies. The upside is huge: Billions of dollars in new business would be generated if these pacts come to pass. 'Yet given the special interests that oppose free trade, neither deal stands much of a chance in Congress without TPA. Consider farm tariffs, one of the most frustrating roadblocks to any free-trade pact with Europe or Asia. The agriculture lobby here and abroad has long succeeded in imposing some of the least competitive public policies of any industry. Although farm protectionism hurts the vast majority of the world's citizens, standing up to clout-heavy constituencies such as U.S. sugar magnates requires extraordinary political courage. TPA is essential for overcoming the inevitable fight against vested interests that are determined to advance themselves at the expense of the nation's good. 'Federal lawmakers and the president have to make their case with much more gusto than we have seen so far. Congress could OK a Trade Promotion Authority bill in the first few months of 2014. But that won't happen without leadership on Capitol Hill and, especially, from the White House. Now's the time.'

Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

Free trade prevents multiple scenarios for world war and WMD Terrorism

Panzner 2008

Michael, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” pg. 136-138

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

# Case

## Hegemony

No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder.

The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

Resilient – hold them to a high threshold for war

Economist, Economist Intelligence Unit – Global Forecasting Service, 11/16/’11

(<http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=gef&articleId=668596451&secID=7>)

The US economy, by any standard, remains weak, and consumer and business sentiment are close to 2009 lows. That said, the economy has been surprisingly resilient in the face of so many shocks. US real GDP expanded by a relatively robust 2.5% in the third quarter of 2011, twice the rate of the previous quarter. Consumer spending rose by 2.4%, which is impressive given that real incomes dropped during the quarter (the savings rate fell, which helps to explain the anomaly.) Historically, US consumers have been willing to spend even in difficult times. Before the 2008-09 slump, personal spending rose in every quarter between 1992 and 2007. That resilience is again in evidence: retail sales in September were at a seven-month high, and sales at chain stores have been strong. Business investment has been even more buoyant: it expanded in the third quarter by an impressive 16.3% at an annual rate, and spending by companies in September on conventional capital goods (that is, excluding defence and aircraft) grew by the most since March. This has been made possible, in part, by strong corporate profits. According to data compiled by Bloomberg, earnings for US companies in the S&P 500 rose by 24% year on year in the third quarter. All of this has occurred despite a debilitating fiscal debate in Washington, a sovereign debt downgrade by a major ratings agency and exceptional volatility in capital markets. This reinforces our view that the US economy, although weak, is not in danger of falling into a recession (absent a shock from the euro zone). US growth will, however, continue to be held back by a weak labour market—the unemployment rate has been at or above 9% for 28 of the last 30 months—and by a moribund housing market.

US not key to global economy – decoupling proves

Merrill Lynch 6 (Merrill Lynch, “US Downturn Won’t Derail World Economy”, 9-18, http://www.ml.com/index.asp?id=7695\_7696\_8149\_63464\_70786\_71164)

A sharp slowdown in the U.S. economy in 2007 is unlikely to drag the rest of the global economy down with it, according to a research report by Merrill Lynch’s (NYSE: MER) global economic team. The good news is that there are strong sources of growth outside the U.S. that should prove resilient to a consumer-led U.S. slowdown. Merrill Lynch economists expect U.S. GDP growth to slow to 1.9 percent in 2007 from 3.4 percent in 2006, but non-U.S. growth to decline by only half a percent (5.2 percent versus 5.7 percent). Behind this decoupling is higher non-U.S. domestic demand, a rise in intraregional trade and supportive macroeconomic policies in many of the world’s economies. Although some countries appear very vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown, one in five is actually on course for faster GDP growth in 2007. Asia, Japan and India appear well placed to decouple from the United States, though Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are more likely to be impacted. European countries could feel the pinch, but rising domestic demand in the core countries should help the region weather the storm much better than in previous U.S. downturns. In the Americas, Canada will probably be hit, but Brazil is set to decouple.

Heg declines inevitable

Christopher Layne is Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M’s George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service, May 01, 2010, “Graceful Decline”, <http://www.amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/> , KENTUCKY

Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis with fundamental handicaps. The Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped massive amounts of dollars into circulation in hope of reviving the economy. Add to that the $1 trillion-plus budget deficits that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) predicts the United States will incur for at least a decade. When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current-account deficit, the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security), and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about the United States’ fiscal stability. As the CBO says, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly unsustainable and urgent fiscal problem.” The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ geopolitical Achilles’ heel. Its role as the international economy’s reserve currency ensures American preeminence, and if it loses that status, hegemony will be literally unaffordable. As Cornell professor Jonathan Kirshner observes, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.” Fears for the dollar’s long-term health predated the current financial and economic crisis. The meltdown has amplified them and highlighted two new factors that bode ill for continuing reserve-currency status. First, the other big financial players in the international economy are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous allies (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has holdings estimated at nearly $2 trillion, is worried that America will leave it with huge piles of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no confidence is reflected in its recent calls to create a new reserve currency. In coming years, the U.S. will be under increasing pressure to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require it to impose fiscal self-discipline through some combination of budget cuts, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Given that the last two options could choke off renewed growth, there is likely to be strong pressure to slash the federal budget. But it will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures. Discretionary non-defense domestic spending accounts for only about 20 percent of annual federal outlays. So the United States will face obvious “guns or butter” choices. As Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of U.S. defense expenditures are “more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending.” Faced with these hard decisions, Americans will find themselves afflicted with hegemony fatigue.

AND – Heg doesn’t solve conflict

Friedman and Preble 10 – Benjamin, research fellow in defense and homeland security at the Cato Institute, Christopher, Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute (September 21, “Drop Pretension to Supremacy,” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=12156&utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds)

Hawks and defense industry trade groups say this spending is essential to U.S. security. But much of Washington's military spending is geared toward defending others and toward the dubious proposition that global stability depends on U.S. military deployments. If our military had less to do, the Pentagon could spend less — at least $1.22 trillion less over the next 10 years, according to a Cato Institute report released Tuesday. Washington confuses what it wants from its military (global primacy or hegemony) with what it needs (safety). Policymakers exaggerate the capability of existing enemies and invent new ones by defining traditional foreign troubles — geopolitical competition among states and instability within them, for example — as major U.S. security threats. In nearly all cases, they are not. Geography, wealth and nuclear weapons provide us with a degree of safety that our ancestors would envy. Sending large armies to occupy — and try to manage the politics of — hostile Muslim countries is not effective counterterrorism policy. In most cases, it is counterproductive. Substantially reducing military spending means reducing U.S. ambitions. By shedding missions, the Pentagon could cut force structure — reducing personnel, weapons and vehicles procured and operational costs. The resulting force would be more elite, less strained and far less expensive. Making large spending cuts without reducing military commitments is a recipe for overburdening service members. Nor should Washington embrace strategic restraint just for budgetary reasons. A force reduction strategy would make sense even without deficits, however, because it could enhance security. It would reduce the possibility of fighting unnecessary wars, limit the number of countries that build up their military to balance U.S. forces, remove an impetus for nuclear weapons proliferation and prevent foreign peoples from resenting us for occupying their countries. Because a less active military can make conventional and counterinsurgency warfare less likely, we recommend cutting the Army and Marine Corps by roughly one-third. Fewer missions, along with advances in strike technology, would also allow for reductions in the Air Force and Navy.

War will decrease in the squo – heg kills the trend

Fettweis 10 Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. (Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” [\_\_Survival\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919), Volume [\_\_52\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=t713659919~tab=issueslist~branches=52#v52), Issue [\_\_2\_\_](http://www.informaworld.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/smpp/title~db=all~content=g920313969) April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld, KENTUCKY)

This trend is apparent on every continent. At the beginning of 2010, the only conflict raging in the Western Hemisphere was the ongoing civil war in Colombia, but even this conflict is far less severe today than it was ten years ago. Europe, which has in the past been the most war-prone of continents, is entirely calm, without even the threat of inter-state conflict. Little war planning now goes on among the European powers, a rather stark departure from previous eras.[22](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0022) Every one of the two billion or so people of the Pacific Rim is currently living in a society at peace. The brief but bloody Sri Lankan civil war was Asia's only conflict in 2009. In Africa, despite a variety of serious on-going challenges, levels of conflict are the lowest they have been in the centuries of written history we have about the continent. In the greater Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian issue continues to simmer, if at a relatively low level, as do the civil war in Yemen and the two counterinsurgency campaigns in which the United States and its allies currently find themselves bogged down. None of this is to suggest that these places are without problems, or that war is impossible. But given the rapid increase in the world's population and the number of countries (the League of Nations had 63 members at its peak between the wars, while the United Nations currently has 192), a pure extrapolation of historical trends might lead one to expect a great deal more warfare than there actually is. Conquest, it seems, is far less common today than it has been throughout history. Territorial disputes, the most common cause of warfare in the past, have dropped to record low levels, especially among the great powers. International borders have all but hardened. By any reasonable measure, the world is living in a golden age of peace and security, even if it may not always appear so.If indeed major war is all but obsolete, as an increasing number of prominent observers believe,[23](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0023) then surely even the most diehard pessimists can admit that the United States need not fear invasion and conquest. State survival, the key factor behind state behaviour according to 'defensive realists', is today all but assured for even the smallest states.[24](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0024) To be sure, throughout most of human history, the obliteration of political entities was a distinct possibility. Polities as diverse as Central Asian empires, Greek poleis and German 'princely states' were all at risk of conquest or absorption by powerful neighbours. That this no longer occurs is an under-appreciated break from the past. Since the Second World War, precisely zero UN members have been forcibly removed from the map.[25](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0025) Today, states are safe from complete annihilation. The stronger countries are even safer; the strongest is the safest. A variety of explanations have been proposed to account for this peaceful trend. Some realists take the view that nuclear weapons have thrust peace upon the otherwise conflictual system.[26](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0026) Liberal explanations include the expanding number of democracies, multilateral institutions and the deepening complexity of economic interdependence.[27](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0027) Constructivists do not necessarily deny the importance of any of these factors, but give primary credit to a change in ideas in contemporary international society.[28](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0028) Those factors exogenous to the human mind are important only to the extent that they affect the way people think, and that society functions. It is ideational evolution, and the corresponding change in behavioural norms regarding conflict, that has been decisive in this view.All these explanations share one important factor: the change they describe is likely to be irreversible. Nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented, and no defence against their use is ever going to be completely foolproof. The pace of globalisation and economic interdependence shows no sign of slowing. Democracy seems to be firmly embedded in the cultural fabric of many of the places it currently exists, and may well be in the process of spreading to the places where it does not. The United Nations shows no signs of disappearing. Finally, normative progress, like that which brought an end to slavery and duelling, tends to be unidirectional. One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.[29](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0029) To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.[30](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a920295991&fulltext=713240928#EN0030) And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

No regional rebalancing or security dilemmas—the only empirical data goes our way.

Fettweis 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ Tulane University [Christopher J. Fettweis, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy,” Paper prepared for presentation at the 2011 meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, Seattle, WA, September 2011, pg. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1902154]

The final and in some ways most important pathological belief generated by hubris places the United States at the center of the current era of relative peace. “All that stands between civility and genocide, order and mayhem,” explain Kaplan and Kristol, “is American power.”68 This belief is a variant of what is known as the “hegemonic stability theory,” which proposes that international peace is only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules.69 Although it was first developed to describe economic behavior, the theory has been applied more broadly, to explain the current proliferation of peace. At the height of Pax Romana between roughly 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring an unprecedented level of peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana in which no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break out around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could bring humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that could ripple throughout global financial markets. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to doubt that U.S hegemony is the primary cause of the current stability. First, the hegemonic-stability argument shows the classic symptom of hubris: It overestimates the capability of the United States, in this case to maintain global stability. No state, no matter how strong, can impose peace on determined belligerents. The U.S. military may be the most imposing in the history of the world, but it can only police the system if the other members generally cooperate. Self-policing must occur, in other words; if other states had not decided on their own that their interests are best served by peace, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could keep them from fighting. The five percent of the world’s population that lives in the United States simply cannot force peace upon an unwilling ninety-five percent. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the explanation for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been especially eager to enforce any particular rules. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been enough to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be preventing them from doing so.71 Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention, yet few choose to do so. Second, it is worthwhile to repeat one of the most basic observations about misperception in international politics, one that is magnified by hubris: Rarely are our actions as consequential upon their behavior as we believe them to be. The ego-centric bias suggests that while it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly overestimating their own importance. At the very least, the United States is probably not as central to the myriad decisions in foreign capitals that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. Third, if U.S. security guarantees were the primary cause of the restraint shown by the other great and potentially great powers, then those countries would be demonstrating an amount of trust in the intentions, judgment and wisdom of another that would be without precedent in international history. If the states of Europe and the Pacific Rim detected a good deal of danger in the system, relying entirely on the generosity and sagacity (or, perhaps the naiveté and gullibility) of Washington would be the height of strategic irresponsibility. Indeed it is hard to think of a similar choice: When have any capable members of an alliance virtually disarmed and allowed another member to protect their interests? It seems more logical to suggest that the other members of NATO and Japan just do not share the same perception of threat that the United States does. If there was danger out there, as so many in the U.S. national security community insist, then the grand strategies of the allies would be quite different. Even during the Cold War, U.S. allies were not always convinced that they could rely on U.S. security commitments. Extended deterrence was never entirely comforting; few Europeans could be sure that United States would indeed sacrifice New York for Hamburg. In the absence of the unifying Soviet threat, their trust in U.S. commitments for their defense would presumably be lower—if in fact that commitment was at all necessary outside of the most pessimistic works of fiction. Furthermore, in order for hegemonic stability logic to be an adequate explanation for restrained behavior, allied states must not only be fully convinced of the intentions and capability of the hegemon to protect their interests; they must also trust that the hegemon can interpret those interests correctly and consistently. As discussed above, the allies do not feel that the United States consistently demonstrates the highest level of strategic wisdom. In fact, they often seem to look with confused eyes upon our behavior, and are unable to explain why we so often find it necessary to go abroad in search of monsters to destroy. They will participate at times in our adventures, but minimally and reluctantly. Finally, while believers in hegemonic stability as the primary explanation for the long peace have articulated a logic that some find compelling, they are rarely able to cite much evidence to support their claims. In fact, the limited empirical data we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on defense fairly substantially, spending $100 billion less in real terms in 1998 that it did in 1990, which was a twenty-five percent reduction.72 To defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace,” argued Kristol and Kagan.”73 If global stability were unrelated to U.S. hegemony, however, one would not have expected an increase in conflict and violence. The verdict from the last two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces.74 No state believed that its security was endangered by a less-capable U.S. military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No defense establishments were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred after the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped that spending back up. The two phenomena are unrelated. These figures will not be enough to convince skeptics. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability, and one could also presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not be expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, two points deserve to be made. First, even if it were true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, it would remain the case that stability can be maintained at drastically lower levels. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still cut back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if, as many suspect, this era of global peace proves to be inherently stable because normative evolution is typically unidirectional, then no increase in conflict would ever occur, irrespective of U.S. spending.75 Abandoning the mission to stabilize the world would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. Second, it is also worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then surely hegemonists would note that their expectations had been justified. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as evidence for the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the relationship between U.S. power and international stability suggests that the two are unrelated. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone. It requires a good deal of hubris for any actor to consider itself indispensable to world peace. Far from collapsing into a whirlwind of chaos, the chances are high that the world would look much like it does now if the United States were to cease regarding itself as God’s gladiator on earth. The people of the United States would be a lot better off as well.

Decline facilitates US multilateralism—paves the way for a soft landing that prevents their transition impacts.

He 10—Professor of Political Science at Utah State University [Kai He (Postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University (2009–2010) and a Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation (2009–2010), “The hegemon’s choice between power and security: explaining US policy toward Asia after the Cold War,” Review of International Studies (2010), 36, pg. 1121–1143]

When US policymakers perceive a rising or a stable hegemony, the anarchic nature of the international system is no longer valid in the mind of US policymakers because the preponderant power makes the US immune from military threats. In the self-perceived, hierarchic international system with the US on the top, power-maximisation becomes the strategic goal of the US in part because of the ‘lust for power’ driven by human nature and in part because of the disappearance of the security constraints imposed by anarchy. Therefore, selective engagement and hegemonic dominion become two possible strategies for the US to maximise its power in the world. The larger the power gap between the US and others, the more likely selective engagement expands to hegemonic dominion. When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security.

US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deficits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best.

During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

However, the US ‘new economy’ based on information technology and computers revived policymakers’ confidence in US hegemony after the Asian miracle was terminated by the 1997 economic crisis. The second part of the 1990s witnessed a rising US hegemony and the George W. Bush administration reached the apex of US power by any measure in the early 21st century. Therefore, since Clinton’s second tenure in the White House, US foreign policy in general and towards Asia in particular has become more assertive and power-driven in nature. Besides reconfirming its traditional military alliances in Asia, the US deepened its military engagement in the region through extensive security cooperation with other Asian states.

The selective engagement policy of the US in the late 1990s was substantially expanded by the Bush administration to hegemonic dominion after 9/11. The unrivalled hegemony relieved US of concerns over security threats from any other states in the international system. The ‘lust for power’ without constraints from anarchy drove US policymakers to pursue a hegemonic dominion policy in the world. The ‘pre-emption strategy’ and proactive missile defence programs reflected the power-maximising nature of the hegemonic dominion strategy during the George W. Bush administration.

What will the US do in the future? The power-perception hegemonic model suggests that the US cannot escape the fate of other great powers in history. When US hegemony is still rising or at a stable stage, no one can stop US expansion for more power. When its economy can no longer afford its power-oriented strategy, the US will face the same strategic burden of ‘imperial overstretch’ that Great Britain suffered in the 19th century. However, the power-perception hegemonic model also argues that US foreign policy depends on how US policymakers perceive the rise and fall of US hegemony.

Multilat leads to global coop and power sharing—it creates shared framework of interaction changes the way states interpret global politics

Pouliot 11—Professor of Poli Sci @ McGill University [Vincent Pouliot, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself,” International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26]

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons.

First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage.

The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement.

In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks.

That cooperation is key to planetary survival—weak regulations risk extinction.

Masciulli 11—Professor of Political Science @ St Thomas University [Joseph Masciulli, “The Governance Challenge for Global Political and Technoscientific Leaders in an Era of Globalization and Globalizing Technologies,” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society February 2011 vol. 31 no. 1 pg. 3-5]

What is most to be feared is enhanced global disorder resulting from the combination of weak global regulations; the unforeseen destructive consequences of converging technologies and economic globalization; military competition among the great powers; and the prevalent biases of short-term thinking held by most leaders and elites. But no practical person would wish that such a disorder scenario come true, given all the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) available now or which will surely become available in the foreseeable future. As converging technologies united by IT, cognitive science, nanotechnology, and robotics advance synergistically in monitored and unmonitored laboratories, we may be blindsided by these future developments brought about by technoscientists with a variety of good or destructive or mercenary motives. The current laudable but problematic openness about publishing scientific results on the Internet would contribute greatly to such negative outcomes.

To be sure, if the global disorder-emergency scenario occurred because of postmodern terrorism or rogue states using biological, chemical, or nuclear WMDs, or a regional war with nuclear weapons in the Middle East or South Asia, there might well be a positive result for global governance. Such a global emergency might unite the global great and major powers in the conviction that a global concert was necessary for their survival and planetary survival as well. In such a global great power concert, basic rules of economic, security, and legal order would be uncompromisingly enforced both globally and in the particular regions where they held hegemonic status. That concert scenario, however, is flawed by the limited legitimacy of its structure based on the members having the greatest hard and soft power on planet Earth.

At the base of our concerns, I would argue, are human proclivities for narrow, short-term thinking tied to individual self-interest or corporate and national interests in decision making. For globalization, though propelled by technologies of various kinds, “remains an essentially human phenomenon . . . and the main drivers for the establishment and uses of disseminative systems are hardy perennials: profit, convenience, greed, relative advantage, curiosity, demonstrations of prowess, ideological fervor, malign destructiveness.” These human drives and capacities will not disappear. Their “manifestations now extend considerably beyond more familiarly empowered governmental, technoscientific and corporate actors to include even individuals: terrorists, computer hackers and rogue market traders” (Whitman, 2005, p. 104).

In this dangerous world, if people are to have their human dignity recognized and enjoy their human rights, above all, to life, security, a healthy environment, and freedom, we need new forms of comprehensive global regulation and control. Such effective global leadership and governance with robust enforcement powers alone can adequately respond to destructive current global problems, and prevent new ones. However, successful human adaptation and innovation to our current complex environment through the social construction of effective global governance will be a daunting collective task for global political and technoscientific leaders and citizens. For our global society is caught in “the whirlpool of an accelerating process of modernization” that has for the most part “been left to its own devices” (Habermas, 2001, p. 112). We need to progress in human adaptation to and innovation for our complex and problematical global social and natural planetary environments through global governance. I suggest we need to begin by ending the prevalent biases of short-termism in thinking and acting and the false values attached to the narrow self-interest of individuals, corporations, and states.

I agree with Stephen Hawking that the long-term future of the human race must be in space. It will be difficult enough to avoid disaster on planet Earth in the next hundred years, let alone the next thousand, or million. . . . There have been a number of times in the past when its survival has been a question of touch and go. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 was one of these. The frequency of such occasions is likely to increase in the future. We shall need great care and judgment to negotiate them all successfully. But I’m an optimist. If we can avoid disaster for the next two centuries, our species should be safe, as we spread into space. . . . But we are entering an increasingly dangerous period of our history. Our population and our use of the finite resources of planet Earth, are growing exponentially, along with our technical ability to change the environment for good or ill. But our genetic code still carries the selfish and aggressive instincts that were of survival advantage in the past. . . . Our only chance of long term survival is not to remain inward looking on planet Earth, but to spread out into space. We have made remarkable progress in the last hundred years. But if we want to continue beyond the next hundred years, our future is in space.” (Hawking, 2010)

Nonetheless, to reinvent humanity pluralistically in outer space and beyond will require securing our one and only global society and planet Earth through effective global governance in the foreseeable future. And our dilemma is that the enforcement powers of multilateral institutions are not likely to be strengthened because of the competition for greater (relative, not absolute) hard and soft power by the great and major powers. They seek their national or alliance superiority, or at least, parity, for the sake of their state’s survival and security now. Unless the global disorder-emergency scenario was to occur soon—God forbid—the great powers will most likely, recklessly and tragically, leave global survival and security to their longer term agendas. Pg. 4-5

Specifically key to Russia relations

**PressTV 09** [Quotes Russian leader, Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony, 15 Sep 2009, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=106209&sectionid=351020602>]

Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday, Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country, have the potential to lead to international conflict. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries," he added. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York, where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas, attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures, suppression of rights and freedoms -- of any illegal activities," he stressed. The Russian leader also took aim at US criticism of Russia's domestic political situation, insisting that Russia was committed to democracy but would not necessarily pursue it in ways prescribed by other states.

Russia relations are key to avoid nuclear war

Allison 11 [Graham, Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow – Council on Foreign Relations, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions.

AND – decline solves China war

MacDonald and Parent 11 [Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College. Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. “Graceful Decline: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment”, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Spring 2011), pp. 7–44, ]

Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America’s superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, “[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia.” 92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

Goes nuclear

Lawrence S. Wittner, Professor of History at the State University of New York, November 28, 2011, “COMMENTARY: Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?”, <http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446>, KENTUCKY

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon. The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.” But need this lead to nuclear war? Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.” Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists. Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan. At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might? Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China. But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction. Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

Heg cause prolif – Extinction

Utgoff, Deputy Director at Institute for Defense Analysis, 2 [Victor, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis, Survival, “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions” 2002 p. 87-90]

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Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons failing into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.’ These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states ‘known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat. And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states. Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognize clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.’ Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations

# 2NC (NO K)

#### Link to their econ advantage – they revitalize US trade

Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy, “China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba”, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, <http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496>, accessed 7/16/13)

At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took the stage with a Chinese official to debate China’s deepening ties with Latin America. The specialist asked whether China is willing to “come to the table” with the United States to promote democratic development in the region. The Chinese official’s reply was revealing: “We are interested in trade, and not in politics.” Talking past – rather than with – each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to international affairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges like these suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, and that Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need for compromise on both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financial instability in the United States and Europe has intensified China’s engagement with developing countries. Sino-Latin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000 to 183 billion USD in 2011, and China’s priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources of foodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new markets for Chinese manufactured products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by government officials, emphasise the economic benefits of their country’s demand for the region’s primary products, evinced by Latin America’s impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011). Latin American publications reflect the region’s historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2) declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policy briefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the economic sustainability of Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionally subsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).

## 2NC – Heg Unsustainable

#### AND – This is a framing question – if they drop one of our warrants it proves heg is unsustainable – their authors are in denial of the overwhelming evidence

Layne 12 [Christopher Layne is the Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, International Studies Quarterly (2012) 56, 203–213,]

Judgment also now can be rendered on the debate between balance of power realists and unipolar stability theorists. As balance of power realists predicted, one new great power already has emerged to act as a counterweight to American power, with others waiting in the wings. In contrast to unipolar stability theorists who said unipolarity would extend well into the twenty-ﬁrst century, balance of power realists predicted that unipolarity would come to an end around 2010. Instead of looking at the trend lines fueling China’s rise and America’s decline, unipolar stability theorists were wrong because they relied on static measures of national power and failed to grasp the velocity of China’s rise. If, indeed, it has not already done so, sometime this decade—- perhaps as early as 2016—China’s GDP will surpass the United States’. No longer is China [ ] an emerging great power; it is a ‘‘risen’’ one. The debate about unipolarity is over. The balance of power realists have won. The distribution of power in international political system is shifting dramatically. The US grand strategy must respond to the emerging constellation of power. Yet, US policymakers and many security studies scholars are in thrall to a peculiar form of denialism. First, they believe the world still is unipolar even in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is not. Second, they believe that even if unipolarity were to end, there would be no real consequences for the United States because it will still be the ‘‘pivotal’’ power in international politics, and the essential features of the ‘‘liberal order’’—the Pax Americana—will remain in place even though no longer buttressed by the US economic and military power that have undergirded it since its inception after World War II. This is myopic. Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-ﬁrst century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world ﬁgures to become a much more turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Accepting the reality of the Unipolar Exit—coming to grips with its own decline and the end of unipolarity symbolized by China’s rise—will be the United States’ central grand strategic preoccupation during the next ten to ﬁfteen years.

## 2NC – A2 – Heg Solves War

#### Meta Framing Question – All of their evidence should be viewed with a lens of skepticism – it over-estimates the importance of the US and under estimates the power of external factors psychology studies – that’s Preble – even if their heg good args could be true they assume pre 9/11 heg

Lieven, 6 (Anatol, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment in the Global Policy Program, Demon in the Cellar, Carnegie, Prospect Magazine, March http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1467)

Because of a deep-rooted (and partly justified) belief in American exceptionalism, and the decline of the study of history, Americans are not used to studying their nationalism in a western historical context. It is important that they begin to do so. Nobody looking at the history of nationalist Europe in the century or so before 1945 would suggest that the US should follow such a path. In particular, American nationalism is beginning to conflict with any enlightened or even rational version of American imperialism: that is to say, with the interests of the US as world hegemon. A relatively benign version of indirect American imperial dominance is by no means unacceptable to many people round the world - both because they often have neighbours whom they fear more than America, and because their leaders are increasingly integrated into a global capitalist elite whose values are largely defined by those of America. But American imperial power in the service of narrow American and Israeli nationalism is a very different matter, and an unstable base for hegemony. It involves power over the world without any responsibility for global problems and without any responsiveness to others' concerns. This is not a matter of sentimental or naive liberal humanism. The US, as unquestioned king of the international order, has a truly vital national and imperial interest in preserving and strengthening it with new rules and conventions. The us is in part simply an old European state which avoided the catastrophes that nationalism brought upon Europe in the 20th century. Its nationalism thus retains an intensity which Europeans have had kicked out of them by history. 72 per cent of Americans say they are "very proud" of their nationality, compared to 49 per cent of Britons, 39 per cent of Italians and just 20 per cent of the Dutch. But the dangers of unreflective nationalist sentiments remain all too obvious. Nationalism thrives on irrational hatreds, and the portrayal of other nations or ethno-religious groups as irredeemably wicked and hostile. Yesterday this was true of the attitudes of many American nationalists to the Soviet Union. Today it risks becoming the case with regard to the Arab and Muslim worlds, or to any country which defies American wishes. The run-up to the war in Iraq saw an astonishing explosion of chauvinism directed against France and Germany.

#### AND – their so called “research” is merely a knee jerk reaction to the overwhelming evidence of US decline – their analysis is clouted with conceptual confusion poor methodology

Yang 10—Ph.D Candidate in the Politics & International Relations Program @ University of Southern California [Xiangfeng Yang, The Unipolar Challenge: Power, Culture and Authority and the Advent of War, March 25, 2010, pg. <http://www.stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Unipolar%20Challenge,%203rd%20Draft.pdf>]

Turning the conventional wisdom on its head, the positivist intellectual enterprise on unipolarity is seriously impeded by not just conceptual confusion but also the lack of methodological rigor. Conceptually, most researchers, many realists included, are slow to realize that the character of unipolarity is fundamentally different phenomenon from bipolarity and multipolarity and that the study of unipolarity presupposes a new set of analytical assumptions most of the time, if not always. Methodologically and theoretically, the obsession with contemporary US hegemony gives the impression that unipolarity is historically unprecedented, such that scholars use the evidence based on which their hypotheses are developed to test their theoretical propositions, a huge taboo in positivist research (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994). The upshot is often that their policy projections leap far ahead of their theoretical and empirical analyses: the same evidence can be interpreted in rather divergent ways, or that the falsification of their theory still awaits what China or the United States will do in the future.8 pg. 13

#### Prefer our evidence – their ev is overly hyperbolic and written by conservative hacks who aren’t even peer reviewed

Fettweis 11 [Christopher J. Fettweis - Department of Political Science Tulane University and Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, “Free Riding or Restraint Examining European Grand Strategy”, Comparative Strategy; Sep/Oct2011, Vol. 30 Issue 4, p316-332, 17p]

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990. 51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.” 52 On the other hand, if the paciﬁc trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conﬂict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending ﬁgures by themselves are insufﬁcient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was signiﬁcantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global paciﬁc trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never ﬁnal; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conﬂict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulﬁlled. If increases in conﬂict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### AND – Statistics prove heg increases the probability and magnitude of global warfare

Montiero 12 [Nuno P. Monteiro is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity is Not Peaceful”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40]

Wohlforth claims not only that the unipole can stave off challenges and preclude major power rivalries, but also that it is able to prevent conflicts among other states and create incentives for them to side with it. 39 The unipole’s advantage is so great that it can settle any quarrel in which it intervenes. As Wohlforth writes, “For as long as unipolarity obtains....second-tier states are less likely to engage in conflict-prone rivalries for security or prestige. Once the sole pole takes sides, there can be little doubt about which party will prevail.” 40 This is the core logic of Wohlforth’s argument that unipolarity is peaceful. But what specifically does his argument say about each of the six possible kinds of war I identified in the previous section? Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 1 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace. How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. 48 In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

## 2NC – Multilateralism Link

AND - It’s empirically proven- US heg causes coordination failures- this accesses every impact

Kliman ’10 (Dr. Daniel M. Kliman is a visiting fellow at the Center for a New American Security, where he contributes to the Asia-Pacific Security Program and other initiatives. He is also completing a book on how to navigate the rise of new power,America's Enduring Challenge: Maintaining International Order, <http://www.cnas.org/node/4809>, 8/4/10, DA: 8/11/10)

Another danger is the growing disparity between the array of 21st-century challenges and the world’s ability to deal with them. The United States lacks the capacity to singularly cope with the challenges before it, while Europe and Japan can offer little additional assistance given their economic troubles. Further, some challenges, by their very nature, require solutions encompassing far more than the traditional pillars of the liberal international order. Coordinated action with today’s rising powers is essential yet difficult in practice. The rising powers are keen to address regional and global challenges in their own way rather than in lockstep with the United States. This can lead to coordination failures, where the United States and the rising powers work at cross-purposes despite having similar objectives. A case in point is Brazil and Turkey’s attempt in May 2010 to broker a nuclear deal with Iran. The two rising powers were trying to achieve a solution to one of the knottiest problems the world confronts, which was commendable, but their initiative was poorly timed with U.S. efforts to impose additional sanctions on Iran, and would not have adequately addressed international concerns about Iran’s capacity to develop nuclear weapons.

#### No transition wars and heg isn’t key---int’l institutions check

Fordham 12—professor of political science at Binghamton University (Ben, International Economic Institutions and Great Power Peace, 8/12/12, http://gt2030.com/2012/08/15/international-economic-institutions-and-great-power-peace/)

I enjoyed Jack Levy’s comments on how the world would have looked to people writing in 1912. As part of my current research, I’ve been spending a lot of time thinking about the three decades before World War I. As Levy pointed out, this last period of great power peace has some interesting parallels with the present one. Like today, the international economy had become increasingly integrated. For good reason, some even refer to this period as the “first age of globalization.” The period also saw the emergence of several new great powers, including Japan, Germany, and the United States. Like emerging powers today, each of these states sought to carve out its own world role and to find, as the German Foreign Secretary put it, a “place in the sun.” Like Levy, I don’t think these parallels we are doomed to repeat the catastrophe of 1914. I want to highlight the different institutional rules governing the international economic system today. The dangers discussed in the NIC report are real, but there is reason for hope when it comes to avoiding great power war. The rules of the game governing the “first age of globalization” encouraged great powers to pursue foreign policies that made political and military conflict more likely. Declining transportation costs, not more liberal trade policies, drove economic integration. There was no web of international agreements discouraging states from pursuing protectionist trade policies. As Patrick McDonald‘s recent book, The Invisible Hand of Peace, explains nicely, protectionism went hand-in-hand with aggressive foreign policies. Many of the great powers, including the emerging United States, sought to shut foreign competitors out of their home markets even as they sought to expand their own overseas trade and investment. Even though markets and investment opportunities in less developed areas of the world were small, great power policy makers found these areas attractive because they would not export manufactured products. As one American policy maker put it in 1899, they preferred “trade with people who can send you things you ant and cannot produce, and take from you in return things they want and cannot produce; in other words, a trade largely between different zones, and largely with less advanced peoples….” Great powers scrambled to obtain privileged access to these areas through formal or informal imperial control. This zero-sum competition added a political and military component to economic rivalry. Increasing globalization made this dangerous situation worse, not better, in spite of the fact that it also increased the likely cost of a great power war. In large part because of the international economic institutions constructed after World War II, present day great powers do not face a world in which protectionism and political efforts to secure exclusive market access are the norm. Emerging as well as longstanding powers can now obtain greater benefits from peaceful participation in the international economic system than they could through the predatory foreign policies that were common in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. They do not need a large military force to secure their place in the sun. Economic competition among the great powers continues, but it is not tied to imperialism and military rivalry in the way it was in 1914. These international institutional differences are probably more important for continuing great power peace than is the military dominance of the United States. American military supremacy reduces uncertainty about the cost and outcome of a hegemonic war, making such a war less likely. However, as in the 19th Century, higher growth rates in emerging powers strongly suggest that the current American military edge will not last forever. Efforts to sustain it will be self-defeating if they threaten these emerging powers and set off a spiral of military competition. Similarly, major uses of American military power without the support (or at least the consent) of other great powers also risk leading these states to build up their military capabilities in order to limit American freedom of action. The United States will be better served by policies that enhance the benefits that emerging powers like China receive from upholding the status quo.

# WAZHIR TOOK THE K ☺

## Ptx

Trade expansion makes all war and escalation less likely---defer negative because the DA structurally controls the case impacts – specifically key to heg and econ

Griswold, 7 (Daniel, director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies, 4/20/2007, Trade, Democracy and Peace, HYPERLINK "<http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>" <http://www.freetrade.org/node/681>)  
A little-noticed headline on an Associated Press story a while back reported, "War declining worldwide, studies say." In 2006, a survey by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the number of armed conflicts around the world has been in decline for the past half-century. Since the early 1990s, ongoing conflicts have dropped from 33 to 17, with all of them now civil conflicts within countries. The Institute's latest report found that 2005 marked the second year in a row that no two nations were at war with one another. What a remarkable and wonderful fact. The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the Associated Press report, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Current estimates of people killed by war are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news--the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them--but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author argued in a forgettable book, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war. I would argue that free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, as I argued a moment ago, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies--a record high. Some studies have cast doubt on the idea that democracies are less likely to fight wars. While it's true that democracies rarely if ever war with each other, it is not such a rare occurrence for democracies to engage in wars with non-democracies. We can still hope that as more countries turn to democracy, there will be fewer provocations for war by non-democracies. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by promoting more economic integration. As national economies become more intertwined with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war.

#### The plan uniquely poisons the well on immigration reform – ensures GOP backlash over spending, and assumes their link turns

Irwin 13 – Neil Irwin, Washington Post columnist and the economics editor of Wonkblog, The Post’s site for policy news and analysis (Neil Irwin, Washington Post: Wonkblog, 02-11-2013, “Is Congress really going to miss its free lunch on infrastructure?”, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/02/11/is-congress-really-going-to-miss-its-free-lunch-on-infrastructure/>, Accessed 08-01-2013 | AK)

Since the election, there have been hints that we could be entering a period with some actual productive, bipartisan dealmaking, most explicitly on immigration reform. But the Republican reaction to Obama’s expected proposals on infrastructure in Tuesday’s State of the Union address may be a better indicator of whether we are in for a year of real legislative give-and-take–or a return of the ugly politics of the last several years. It will also be an indication of whether the U.S. government is going to let a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rebuild the nation’s roads and bridges more or less for free slip through its fingers. The early buzz from the White House is that while Obama will discuss the current legislative hot-buttons of immigration and gun control, the economy is a major focus of his speech. In particular, he will call for new infrastructure investment–roads, bridges, power grid, that sort of thing. The big question on infrastructure is whether the White House is correctly reading the politics of the moment. Could Congressional Republicans be ready to sign on to some form of large-scale investment in the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure? Or is Obama tilting at windmills (literally, in this case). It comes as we may be approaching the end of a five year period in which investing in the nation’s physical infrastructure has been something close to a free lunch. With interest rates near all-time lows and millions of construction workers unemployed, the last few years have been a time that it would have been a historical bargain for the United States to do upgrades to roads, bridges, and airports that will eventually need to take place anyway. It has been a political breakdown–in particular conservatives’ view of almost any non-defense federal spending as wasteful–standing in the way. This graph shows total private fixed investment relative to the nation’s potential GDP, going back to 1949. (That’s how much the private sector is spending on both houses and commercial installations). After averaging 15.5 percent from 1949 to 2007, private investment fell as low as 10.6 percent in the economic collapse starting in 2008 (it was 12.2 percent at the end of 2012). In other words, for the last few years private construction activity has been far below its historic norms. And so long as the private sector isn’t building houses and office buildings and factories, the government can build without crowding out private investment. But that window might not last much longer; at the current pace, private investment will be back to its historical average in another few years. It’s not now or never, exactly, but it very likely will be cheaper now to spruce up the nation’s transportation and energy infrastructure than it will be in the not-too-distant future. In concept, this is an area where there should be room for the two parties to work together. Business interests tend to favor new infrastructure spending, for both the benefits it brings for the companies that would like faster and more efficient ways to ship their goods and the construction companies that stand to make money actually building the stuff. Even small government conservatives want to have quality roads in their districts. Wisely chosen infrastructure spending should not increase the national debt over time, as upfront expenditures are paid back either through tolls and user fees, greater economic development, or both. Over the last few years, though, those facts have crashed headlong into a widespread view in the Republican caucus that any federal spending is wasteful. “Anything that is akin to the stimulus bill is not going to be acceptable to the American people,” House Majority Leader Eric Cantor said in September 2011, after Obama proposed a series of job-creation measures centered around new infrastructure. But a few things have changed since then. First, Republicans have seen electoral damage by their image as an obstruction-at-all-cost party, losing the White House and seats in both houses of Congress in the 2012 elections. Cantor himself delivered a speech last week aimed at presenting a more pragmatic face to the party. Second, the president has been re-elected, so there is no longer the odd dynamic where bipartisan dealmaking could make Obama look more statesmanlike and help his re-election chances. Much of the Republican opposition to infrastructure spending has been rooted in a conviction that all government spending is a boondoggle, taxing hard-working Americans to give benefits to a favored few, and exceeding any reasonable cost estimate in the process. That’s always a risk with new spending on infrastructure: that instead of the Hoover Dam and the interstate highway system, you end up with the Bridge to Nowhere and the Big Dig.

### 2NC – Jackson [:25]

#### AND – alt has an external net benefit – structural violence – their focus on threats obscures causes of insecurity – only human security solves

Jackson 12—Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University (8/5/12, Richard, The Great Con of National Security, http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/08/05/the-great-con-of-national-security/)

It may have once been the case that being attacked by another country was a major threat to the lives of ordinary people. It may also be true that there are still some pretty serious dangers out there associated with the spread of nuclear weapons. For the most part, however, most of what you’ve been told about national security and all the big threats which can supposedly kill you is one big con designed to distract you from the things that can really hurt you, such as the poverty, inequality and structural violence of capitalism, global warming, and the manufacture and proliferation of weapons – among others.¶ The facts are simple and irrefutable: you’re far more likely to die from lack of health care provision than you are from terrorism; from stress and overwork than Iranian or North Korean nuclear missiles; from lack of road safety than from illegal immigrants; from mental illness and suicide than from computer hackers; from domestic violence than from asylum seekers; from the misuse of legal medicines and alcohol abuse than from international drug lords. And yet, politicians and the servile media spend most of their time talking about the threats posed by terrorism, immigration, asylum seekers, the international drug trade, the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea, computer hackers, animal rights activism, the threat of China, and a host of other issues which are all about as equally unlikely to affect the health and well-being of you and your family. Along with this obsessive and perennial discussion of so-called ‘national security issues’, the state spends truly vast sums on security measures which have virtually no impact on the actual risk of dying from these threats, and then engages in massive displays of ‘security theatre’ designed to show just how seriously the state takes these threats – such as the x-ray machines and security measures in every public building, surveillance cameras everywhere, missile launchers in urban areas, drones in Afghanistan, armed police in airports, and a thousand other things. This display is meant to convince you that these threats are really, really serious.¶ And while all this is going on, the rulers of society are hoping that you won’t notice that increasing social and economic inequality in society leads to increased ill health for a growing underclass; that suicide and crime always rise when unemployment rises; that workplaces remain highly dangerous and kill and maim hundreds of people per year; that there are preventable diseases which plague the poorer sections of society; that domestic violence kills and injures thousands of women and children annually; and that globally, poverty and preventable disease kills tens of millions of people needlessly every year. In other words, they are hoping that you won’t notice how much structural violence there is in the world.¶ More than this, they are hoping that you won’t notice that while literally trillions of dollars are spent on military weapons, foreign wars and security theatre (which also arguably do nothing to make any us any safer, and may even make us marginally less safe), that domestic violence programmes struggle to provide even minimal support for women and children at risk of serious harm from their partners; that underfunded mental health programmes mean long waiting lists to receive basic care for at-risk individuals; that drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes lack the funding to match the demand for help; that welfare measures aimed at reducing inequality have been inadequate for decades; that health and safety measures at many workplaces remain insufficiently resourced; and that measures to tackle global warming and developing alternative energy remain hopelessly inadequate.¶ Of course, none of this is surprising. Politicians are a part of the system; they don’t want to change it. For them, all the insecurity, death and ill-health caused by capitalist inequality are a price worth paying to keep the basic social structures as they are. A more egalitarian society based on equality, solidarity, and other non-materialist values would not suit their interests, or the special interests of the lobby groups they are indebted to. It is also true that dealing with economic and social inequality, improving public health, changing international structures of inequality, restructuring the military-industrial complex, and making the necessary economic and political changes to deal with global warming will be extremely difficult and will require long-term commitment and determination. For politicians looking towards the next election, it is clearly much easier to paint immigrants as a threat to social order or pontificate about the ongoing danger of terrorists. It is also more exciting for the media than stories about how poor people and people of colour are discriminated against and suffer worse health as a consequence.¶ Viewed from this vantage point, national security is one massive confidence trick – misdirection on an epic scale. Its primary function is to distract you from the structures and inequalities in society which are the real threat to the health and wellbeing of you and your family, and to convince you to be permanently afraid so that you will acquiesce to all the security measures which keep you under state control and keep the military-industrial complex ticking along.¶ Keep this in mind next time you hear a politician talking about the threat of uncontrolled immigration, the risk posed by asylum seekers or the threat of Iran, or the need to expand counter-terrorism powers. The question is: when politicians are talking about national security, what is that they don’t want you to think and talk about? What exactly is the misdirection they are engaged in? The truth is, if you think that terrorists or immigrants or asylum seekers or Iran are a greater threat to your safety than the capitalist system, you have been well and truly conned, my friend. Don’t believe the hype: you’re much more likely to die from any one of several forms of structural violence in society than you are from immigrants or terrorism. Somehow, we need to challenge the politicians on this fact.

### 2NC – V2L

#### Destroys value to life

Dillon 96 [Michael, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, Politics of Security: Towards a Political Philosophy of Continental Thought, p. 26]

Everything, for example, has now become possible. But what human being seems most impelled to do with the power of its actions is to turn itself into a species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a mere species of calculation. For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that political arithmetic by which it can secure the security globalised Western thought insists upon, and which a world made increasingly unpredictable by the very way human being acts into it now seems to require. Yet, the very rage for calculability which securing security incites is precisely also what reduces human freedom, inducing either despair or the surrender of what is human to the de-humanising calculative logic of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surrender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterised by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that things have gone one stage further—the surrender to the necessity of realising everything that is possible—and that this found its paradigmatic expression, for example, in the deterrent security policies of the Cold War; where everything up to and including self-immolation not only became possible but actually necessary in the interests of (inter)national security. This logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics—the axioms of inter-State security relations, popularised, for example, through strategic discourse— even if the details have changed.

#### BIW is wrong – 6 reasons

Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, January 2, 2013, “ More or less: The debate on U.S. grand strategy”, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/02/more_or_less_the_debate_on_us_grand_strategy>, KENTUCKY

The first piece is Barry Posen's "Pull Back: The Case for a Less Activist Foreign Policy," and the second is Stephen Brooks, John Ikenberry, and William Wohlforth's "Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement." (A longer version of the B, I & W argument can be found in the latest issue of International Security; Posen's argument is outlined at length in a forthcoming book.) Dedicated readers of this blog know that I am largely in agreement with Posen's position, so I'm going to focus today on what I find lacking in B, I & W. Like all of their work, it's vigorously argued and the longer version is richly documented. But all those footnotes cannot save it from some serious weaknesses. First, B, I, & W straw-man their target by lumping together a group of strategic thinkers whose differences are at least as significant as their points of agreement. The "proponents of retrenchment" that they criticize range from libertarian isolationists who want to bring virtually all US forces home to "offshore balancers" like Posen who support a robust but less extravagant defense budget and favor not isolationism but merely more limited forms of international engagement. Needless to say, there is a world of difference in these views (even if both are broadly in favor of doing less), and so many of B, I & W's broad-brush charges miss their mark. Second, there is something deeply puzzling about B, I & W's devotion to what Ikenberry used to called "liberal hegemony," and what he and his co-authors now prefer to call "deep engagement." B, I & W argue that deep engagement has been America's grand strategy since World War II and they believe it was the optimal strategy for the bipolar Cold War, when the United States faced a global threat from a major great-power rival. Not only was the USSR a formidable military power, but it was also an ideological rival whose Marxist-Leninist principles once commanded millions of loyal followers around the world. Here's the puzzle: the Soviet Union disappeared in 1992, and no rival of equal capacity has yet emerged. Yet somehow "deep engagement" is still the optimal strategy in these radically different geopolitical circumstances. It's possible that U.S. leaders in the late 1940s hit on the ideal grand strategy for any and all structural conditions, but it is surely odd that an event as significant as the Soviet collapse can have so few implications for how America deals with the other 190-plus countries around the globe. Third, B, I, & W give "deep engagement" full credit for nearly all the good things that have occurred internationally since 1945 (great power peace, globalization, non-proliferation, expansion of trade, etc.), even though the direct connection between the strategy and these developments remains contested. More importantly, they absolve the strategy from most if not all of the negative developments that also took place during this period. They recognize the events like the Indochina War and the 2003 war in Iraq were costly blunders, but they regard them as deviations from "deep engagement" rather than as a likely consequence of a strategy that sees the entire world as of critical importance and the remaking of other societies along liberal lines as highly desirable if not strategically essential. The problem, of course, is that U.S. leaders can only sell deep engagement by convincing Americans that the nation's security will be fatally compromised if they do not get busy managing the entire globe. Because the United States is in fact quite secure from direct attack and/or conquest, the only way to do that is by ceaseless threat-mongering, as has been done in the United States ever since the Truman Doctrine, the first Committee on the Present Danger and the alarmist rhetoric of NSC-68. Unfortunately, threat-mongering requires people in the national security establishment to exaggerate U.S. interests more-or-less constantly and to conjure up half-baked ideas like the domino theory to keep people nervous. And once a country has talked itself into a properly paranoid frame of mind, it inevitably stumbles into various quagmires, as the United States did in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Again, such debacles are not deviations from "deep engagement"; they are a nearly inevitable consequence of it. Fourth, B, I, & W largely ignore the issue of opportunity cost. Advocates of restraint like Posen (and myself) are not saying that the United States cannot afford to intervene in lots of overseas venues, they are saying that the United States would be better off with a smaller set of commitments and a more equitable division of labor between itself and its principal allies. If the United States were not spending more than more of the world combined on "deep engagement," it could invest more in infrastructure here at home, lower taxes, balance budgets more easily, provide more generous health or welfare benefits, or do whatever combination of the above the public embraced. Fifth, B, I, & W argue that deep engagement works because hardly anybody is actively trying to balance American power. In their view, most of the world likes this strategy, and is eager for Washington to continue along the same path. On the one hand, this isn't that surprising: why shouldn't NATO countries or Japan prefer a world where they can spend 1-2% of GDP on defense while Uncle Sucker shoulders the main burden? More importantly, advocates of restraint believe doing somewhat less would encourage present allies to bear a fairer share of the burden, and also discourage some of them from adventurist behavior encouraged by excessive confidence in U.S. protection (which Posen terms "reckless driving"). If the U.S. played hard-to-get on occasion, it would discover that some of its allies would do more both to secure their own interests and to remain eligible for future U.S. help. Instead of bending over backwards to convince the rest of the world that the United States is 100 percent reliable, U.S. leaders should be encouraging other states to bend over backwards to convince us that they are worth supporting. Moreover, even if most of the world isn't balancing U.S. power, the parts that are remain troublesome. For instance, "deep engagement" in the Middle East has produced some pretty vigorous balancing behavior, in the form of Iraq and Iran's nuclear programs, Tehran's support for groups such as Hezbollah, and the virulent anti-Americanism of Al Qaeda. Indeed, the more deeply engaged we became in the region (especially with the onset of "dual containment" following the first Gulf War), the more local resistance we faced. Ditto our "deep engagement" in Iraq and Afghanistan. And given that those two wars may have cost upwards of $3 trillion, it seems clear that at least a few people have "balanced" against the United States with a certain amount of success. Sixth, reading B, I, & W, one would hardly know that the nuclear revolution had even occurred. Nuclear weapons are not very useful as instruments of coercion, but they do make their possessors largely unconquerable and thus reduce overall security requirements considerably. Because the United States has a second-strike capability sufficient to devastate any country foolish enough to attack us, the core security of the United States is not in serious question. The presence of nuclear weapons in the hands of eight other countries also makes a conventional great power war like World War I or World War II exceedingly unlikely. Yet despite this fundamental shift in the global strategic environment, B, I & W believe the United States must remain "deeply engaged" in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in order to prevent a replay of the first half of the 20th century. To repeat: most of the strategists who reject "deep engagement/liberal hegemony" do not call for isolationism, a retreat to Fortress America, or a slash-and-burn approach to defense spending. On the contrary: they favor continued U.S. engagement, albeit in a more restrained, highly selective, and strategically sustainable way. They believe the United States should seek to maintain favorable balances of power in key regions, but that it does not need to provide all the military muscle itself and certainly should not try to dictate or control the political evolution of these areas with military force. They believe this approach would preserve core U.S. interests at an acceptable cost, and would be far better suited to the current distribution of global power. "Deep engagement" might have been a good strategy for the Cold War, though even that proposition is debatable. But as you may have noticed, the Cold War is now over. Isn't it about time that U.S. grand strategy caught up with that fact?

THE HEG LINK WINS US THE DEBATE

DAVID GRONDIN University of Ottawa, Canada, 2006, “Hegemony or Empire? The Redefinition of US Power under George W. Bush”, P. 6-22, KENTUCKY

[O]ur political imagination has been restricted by our uncritical acceptance of our own rhetorical construction of democracy, a construction that privileges free-enterprise capitalism and republicanism. Such a construction – limiting, as it does, our ability to understand both ourselves and others – needs to be rhetorically reconstructed to serve the needs of globalism as different nations struggle toward their own definitions, policies, and practices. The first step in such a rhetorical reconstruction is to become aware of our own language choices and the narratives and assumptions embedded in these choices.1 There is not a day that goes without American power being addressed or discussed in one way or another in the global media. Indeed, over the past five years, no subject has been more studied or discussed in world politics than the sheer extent of American power as imperialism, empire or hegemony, sometimes as praise but most frequently as resentment. A number of recent commentators and analysts have in fact noted the possibility of an imperialist turn in the conceptualization and prosecution of US foreign policy. Hence, several discussions of an ‘American Empire’ and a ‘Pax Americana’ have garnished the political spectrum of many opinion-editorial pages of major papers across the globe, especially in the aftermath of the swift US military ‘victory’ in the 2003 Iraqi War. Sadly, in many cases, one can say that the emperor has been stripped of his clothes – and most of the time he was not even an emperor. The use of the term ‘empire’ has been a shortcut for any form of critique of US foreign policy at large since September 11, 2001, prior to the concept being discussed in a rigorous or serious way. In these instances, the galvanized epithet appears in itself as superfluous for the harsh criticism would have been levelled at the US no matter what. One could put forth the idea that the US could be construed as an ‘informal empire’, a recurrent term in the literature on American imperialism. A fortiori, it sure possesses some analytical power, as it takes into account the importance of rules, norms and institutions. However, for many theorists, this dynamic would be better served by the term ‘hegemony’, which has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of consensus and persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of military power and coercion in the evolution of US foreign policy. This view is mostly associated with the work of John Ikenberry, Daniel Deudney, Andrew Hurrell and John Agnew. These scholars argue that ‘it is analytically more useful to understand the United States as a hegemonic rather than an imperial power’, especially since hegemony would be cast as being less an ‘intrusive mode of control’ than empire.2 In fact, there is much leverage in this view that shall make it more compelling and attractive as a policy-oriented research agenda. All the more reason that most of the authors in this book implicitly or explicitly tackle the concept of US hegemony more than they take issue with empire. Perhaps it is John Agnew who put it best: ‘Which word – empire or hegemony – best describes the role of the US in contemporary world politics? If it is an empire, it is a peculiarly incoherent and increasingly hollow one. It is better seen as increasingly subject to pressures from the very hegemony it has released on the world.’3 That being said, if it makes more sense to use the concept of hegemony to understand how American power works in contemporary world politics, does it mean that if one considers American power in longue durée, by situating the rise of the US as a regional and then global power and by putting it in a broad historical context, empire and imperialism become more relevant concepts? Even so, there would still be nominal issues to consider. The might of American power is so strong and extensive that it is impossible for any actor/agent of world politics not to feel threatened or beleaguered by the ‘success story of the United States’ as a nation-state. One cannot help but notice how sentiments of anti-Americanism have been expressed in several places where they could not have been thought possible or at an intensity never before reached. Some say that America’s ‘soft power’ and its cultural appeal are decreasing and that the US is, ‘again’, on a declining curve. No matter what name American power has been given, whether it is empire, imperialism or hegemony, one must take a step back and reassess the exercise and representation of American power as well as its perception since George W. Bush took office. Today’s American hegemony/empire is more powerful than at any time in history. Yet it is under constant and even growing challenges in several spheres and ways. What has become of the US as the ‘beacon on the hill’? According to the exceptionalist narrative, the United States has been anything but an empire. Therefore, it could, would and shall never be compared to other empires in history, present or past. This was and still is the essential leitmotiv behind an ‘American exceptionalism’. Is it so far disconnected from its original ‘covenant’ as to bear no possible mention of its liberal and enlightened roots? Furthermore, has it come to a point that US nationalist expansion has become a sham (and shameful) quest for power? This book is most certainly as much a study of American nationalism, hegemony and imperialism as it is of US sovereignty and state-building experiences. America as a Place – and a Nation-State The modern ‘system of territorial division’, of territorializations, made national states the primary locus of political, economic and cultural organization. This is the result of cartography, where territorial representation exists as a mental or illustrated map. With mapping, one proceeds to the reterritorialization of the world, as the state invests – reconstructs – ‘its nation and people with new meaning’. Therefore, remapping participates in ‘the fragmentation of the map of the contemporary world’ through cartography.4 Indeed, ‘[t]he undoubted success of the United States as a political-economic and cultural enterprise over the long term should not blind us to the limitations of the official story’.5 When considering US global power, the resulting map is necessarily an approximation, an interpretation and a codification of reality. The globe in its entire cartographic representation is of interest to the US, because it has global power, responsibilities and interests. This is why, in the study of US power and of its redefinition, one needs to study both the US in its national context and abroad. But for that to happen, a dominant discourse writing the nation must be assessed for the United States of America. ‘[T]he national space of the United States is politically stabilized and homogenized through a dominant story, [...] [which] story is then widely accepted as a true account of the ways things operate, irrespective of empirical observations to the contrary.’6 Maps shape a world that in turn shapes its maps: it is a recursive social process that renders modern cartographical practices epistemologically linked to the inscription of the nation/state in the spatial abstraction that embodied it and the territorial description that associated it with a national identity. The first part of this book is interested in one such particular ‘state-space’, that of the United States of America. We are thus interested in the narratives that construct the US as it exists as a political entity in its dominant story of a unified United States of America. When we look at the space (space as controlled or commanded) of the United States in today’s world order, it is as if we were looking down on the United States territory and people as outside ‘observers’. This top-down approach construes space as an area where a collective entity is ‘held together’ in popular consciousness by a map-image and a narrative or story that represents it as a meaningful whole; it is as if ‘powerful actors [were] imposing their control and stories on others’.7 However, when we look at its place, it is as if we were going from bottom-up, looking at the peoples. In considering global politics, because people matter, ‘[p]lace signifies their encounter with one another in the material reality (environment) that is construed as “space”’.8 It refers to how everyday life is inscribed in space and takes on meaning for specified groups of people or organizations. Admittedly, ‘[t]he United States government can change entirely from decade to decade, but the need to make Americans, out of a land called America, continues in new and unexpected forms.’9 American historian of the ‘frontier experience’ Richard Slotkin writes that ‘so long as the nation-state remains the prevalent form of social organization, something like a national myth/ideology will be essential to its operation’.10 We are told that ‘America was constituted in the space between law and outlawry, between legitimacy and rebellion, between the immediacy of the spoken word and the endurance of the written text. America is a nation where “law is king,” yet the Americans are also “a people who think lightly of the laws”.’11 This constitutive contradiction marks the law as an axis in the structure of American identity. Contradictions are by all means at the core of American national identity as an ‘empire of liberty’. One needs to assess the tensions of the actual United States with the ideal(ized) ‘first new nation’ that we find inscribed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It is this representational force of the Constitution over Americans, of the ‘Homeland as a text’, that allows Americans to compare their existence in the world as ‘Americans’ to their ideal existence written for eternity in the Constitution: Interpretation of the Constitution is thus an ambivalent communion, coupling the people and the text, the material and the ideal, aspiration and experience. In it the people recognize their ambivalent constitution between word and flesh. In it the people recall their authority. [...] Because it acknowledges the people as author of a text they know to have authored them, it invites them to recognize the dialectical nature of constitution. Because they are written into the text, as much in the name of the thing as in its content, it invites them to confirm that writing in the act and the acknowledgement of interpretation as a constitutional activity. It obliges them to be critical if they would be obedient, to comprehend the text if they are to be comprehended within it.12 Why is it so pregnant in American political culture to represent the US as the ‘first new nation’, as a ‘revolutionary yet civilized’ colonization as if it had had a ‘clean break’ from history?13 Above all, in studying American expansionism in the post–World War II period, but especially since the end of the Cold War, one major concern of this book is that one does not need to adhere to or reassess American exceptionalism, which has been ruled out by numerous and rigorous historical studies of Early American history, of political theory, and of studies of American political development, even though it has never been able to reach a consensus in any of these aforementioned fields14. It does not mean however that one does not taken into account American exceptionalism. Why Not Address American National Experience as an Empire? As stated previously, this book does not share common views on the use of the terms ‘empire’ and ‘hegemony’ to refer to the United States’ power, at least since WWII. However, what is more consensual is that there were US imperialist experiences at the turn of the 20th century in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines, among other places. Whether these experiences are limited in time and bear influences on actual US practices does not prevent us from addressing the empire as part of the American state experience. As will be seen in the individual chapters, where one starts and assesses American imperialism and hegemony is a matter of contention and debate. But it is nevertheless a custodial concern of this book that all agree that the US was once an empire. For some, it may have been an empire in spirit or in the making, as it was foundationally presented as an ‘empire of liberty’ by Thomas Jefferson. However, the mere facts that there is so much talk of a (re)turn to imperialism serves as proof of contested views on experiences of American imperialism. For Stefan Heumann, when applied to the United States, ‘The concept of empire transcends the disciplinary boundaries between foreign and domestic politics ... [because] domestic liberal institutions have to cope with imperial policies which originated from the encounter with the foreign.’15 This imperial encounter in fact goes at the heart of a related and often belated theme, that of colonialism.16 In effect, the first concept one encounters when dealing with imperialism is that of colonialism (and now neo-colonialism). The problem most frequently encountered is taking colonialism for imperialism. In many instances imperialism is used as a synonym for colonialism, as if one were politically better than the other. If imperialism sure goes with colonialism, we should at least strive to nuance what colonialism was in conjunction with imperialism by refining the use of imperialism in such context. The generalization of imperialism over the theoretical span is unhelpful. For one thing, the US experience with imperialism was not the same everywhere. With most of Latin American countries, it tended to be more an informal imperialism, that is, the exercise of control by one sovereign state over another or others through various diplomatic, economic, political or military means and strategies. But in the Philippines, for instance, it did not materialize this way. Imperialism there turned into colonialism, for the Philippines became ruled by an apparatus constructed by the US and the US acted as an overseas colonial empire. Colonialism here is thus formal imperialism in contrast to the Latin American guise of American imperialism; it ‘involves the explicit and often legally codified establishment of direct political domination over a foreign territory and peoples’.17 The same went for Puerto Rico in 1898.18 As it is widely known there were debates, even fierce ones, over whether the US should follow the example of other European imperial powers by annexing the islands of the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, Puerto Rico, and on ascertaining formal colonial rule over overseas people.19 What is certain, though, as historian Michael Adas relates, is that the first two governors of the Philippines that were sent by the US government in the newly created colonies of the Philippines of the American empire, William H. Taft and Luke Wright, viewed the British experience of colonization as ‘the most obvious models for United States colonial policy’.20 However, one must point out that in their minds a true sense of exceptionalism and manifest destiny was reactivated, as US colonial rule policy was seen as part of a civilizing process and missions that should aim at an ‘an alternate regeneration’ of the Philippines in America’s image. There were frequent ‘claims of exceptionalism grounded in misreadings of the colonial history of America’s rivals, or in rather blinkered assessments of both the domestic situation in the US and the nature of colonial society in the Philippines’.21 Most American stories were silent about the segregationist, paternalistic and racist influences in the US elite thinking. Indeed, American official discourse saw its colonial governing practices as distinctive and upscale when compared with European colonialisms. This exceptionalist thinking may owe a great deal to that teleological narrative ‘that encompassed the history of the rise of the United States from an oppressed colony in its own right to its newly claimed positions as a global power’.22 No matter how inaccurate it is in its representation of imperialist and neo-colonial practices of the US, this powerful narrative helps us understand how the whole civilizing mission in the Philippines took the form of an ideology of modernization and liberation of the rest of humanity in the height of the Cold War23 and why it took a long time before being able to reinsert talks of American imperialism and empire in public discourse in the US. The Study of American Imperialism/Empire Any incursion in the study of imperialism comes with great pain for there are so many concepts to juggle with before even starting the analysis. This even gets harder when addressing US imperialism and its (un)likely empire. What are we dealing with when assessing the US as an empire? As historian Anders Stephanson stresses, the term has descriptive value: That the United States does indeed possess a colonial empire overseas, whose aquatic area are equals that of the lower forty-eight lower states, may be a descriptive proposition; but it is also an interesting fact that demands exploration and explanation. Empire on that view signifies nothing but a legal and political form, and sometimes, with all the proper caveats, it is illuminating to describe a system as an empire. What is particularly interesting about the US variety is the obvious anomaly: persisting, formal inferiority within a liberal framework, an official anti-colonialism that both recognizes and manages not to recognize the colonial fact.24 How must we interpret the colonial appendages of the US? Do they fall within the parameters of imperialism? The denial – and absence – of an imperial structure does in fact render any question of an American empire somewhat problematic. Do we factor in the intent or the results? In this respect, what may qualify as an American empire? With the exception of Puerto Rico, Guam, the US Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands and American Samoa, now that (most) US colonies are independent, some make the compelling argument that to talk of American imperialism one must do it in a classical sense, that is, as European imperialism, and must limit its analysis to 1898 and its immediate aftermath, thus to what is constructed as ‘America’s imperialist moment’ which is now said to ‘[have] come and gone’.25 To be sure, there may be some value to this line of argument. Imperialism is such an imbued concept that one always needs to know precisely how it is being used. One may even wonder whether the term has lost all relevant meaningful uses. For quite a long time, only the New Left historians of the 1960s, who argued along Marxist lines, and other Marxist theorists believed that the US had been an imperialist power since at least the 1870s (or even from its very birth). Yet this empire was not seen, with the exception of some specific cases (the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, among others), as a European-style colonialist empire, but rather as an informal economic empire – a capitalist power – interested in offshore markets, in Asia and China especially. Until recently, our understanding of the history and development of American power/hegemony was based on a conceptual definition that excluded empires because the US was constructed as being so exceptional that it was impossible to compare it with other empires. Numerous Cold War historians, as well as International Relations (IR) scholars, that have now taken a more historical-materialist approach have suggested that considering the US as an empire through the use of the literature on globalization would provide some better historical and conceptual bases for both areas of thought, as well as providing some insight for the overall context of the present imperial discourse. Furthermore, combining an American empire with globalization could give us a more historicized version of globalization, and one that firmly brings power back into the equation, instead of taking globalization as a neutral and/or natural phenomenon.26 It could also give a more adequate concept of the place of the US in the contemporary international system, and some basis for comparison with the past. This historical sociology argument thus makes bringing the US as an empire back into the IR discourse even more relevant, even if it may still be rejected afterwards. In truth, when comparing the United States with other empires one must not forget the context of global capitalism, and especially of globalization. Another thing to be aware of is that in so doing, in comparing US imperialism with other imperialisms from the 19th century onwards, the role of world order producer of the United States in the prevalent globalized neoliberal hegemony must be accounted for. In many respects, there seems to be intricate relations to be deciphered from the nexus of globalization, security and hegemony/empire that characterizes American power in our time. In effect, the identity politics of the US could diminish the added value of comparative historical analysis. As asserts Martin Coward, ‘Often this has been in the unhelpful form of generalisations drawing upon models of imperialism that were designed to explain the colonialist expansion of capitalism in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. And yet it is clear that such models are poorly suited to the analysis of American power in the early twenty-first century – not least because America has always insisted, in its self identity, that it is an anti-imperial, anti-colonial power.’27 Drawing on the recent literature on a ‘new American imperialism/empire’, it would consequently become possible to undertake a critique of the new-found US imperial hegemony by way of taking cues from Hardt and Negri’s Empire as a deterritorialized and borderless entity.28 Entering the terrain of this Empire could indeed prove to be a good intellectual strategy if one wishes to understand the complexities of the networks of command and power relations at play in the reordering of global politics that has generally been subsumed under the title of ‘globalization’.29 US Liberalism and Exceptionalism Is US global dominance or its quest a call to empire? If not, why has the language of empire had such a ‘new beginning’ recently? As nicely put by the mainstream of American foreign policy ideologies, but especially by its arch-type, John Mearsheimer, the United States as hegemon may pursue a liberal world order, but must often do so through illiberal means. So this idea of a liberal empire brings back the issue of what liberalism is (American-style), and what recent US attempts are at reshaping the world order to its liking. And as Amy Kaplan puts it, ‘In a dramatic turn away from the disavowal of its own imperial history, the embrace of empire across the political spectrum celebrates and normalizes US global dominance as an inevitable process. The notion of the homeland, with its nativist connotations, works to protect a sense of domestic insularity, always under attack yet cordoned off from the threatening outside world. While mainstream discourse places the homeland and the empire in separate spheres ... isolationism and internationalism in US policy today are two sides of the same imperial coin’, as are American exceptionalism and universalism.30 American exceptionalism and the manifest destiny image are at the heart of any understanding of US imperialism/empire. The whole liberal imagination that so deeply characterizes the US – and that is mainly indebted to Louis Hartz’s intellectual legacy in the American social sciences31 – most assuredly accounts for the contradictions within the American republic, discarding the very idea of empire. The constant re-articulation of the ideal of the US as ‘an empire of liberty’ leaves no place for an American empire, even though it seems undisputable. If we understand US nationalist power and the project of an American liberal Republic as a different form of imperialism, it may become possible to address this issue of hegemony/empire without having to face the usual oppositions from Americans themselves and American academics especially. It may decidedly be one way to reappraise neoconservatism within the ideological web that renders it intelligible, that of American liberalism, for it helps us make sense of the discourse of a new American empire/imperialism. As Anne Norton explains, ‘Liberalism has become the common sense of the American people, a set of principles unconsciously adhered to, a set of conventions so deeply held that they appear (when they appear at all) to be no more than common sense. The capacity of liberalism to transform itself in America from ideology to common sense is the proof – as it is the means – of its constitutional power.’32 American liberalism has evolved as the ‘peculiar fusion of providential and republican ideology that took place after the Revolution’ and stands as the civil and political religion that animates the powerful ‘master narrative’ of a manifest destiny, whereas liberalism becomes a ‘manner of interpreting the space and time of “America”’.33 Therein lays a unification of a sacred and secular conception of liberty, of a providential mission and sense of moral crusade that would identify ‘America’ and guide its action in the world. America’s peculiar situation had in many respects made it an object of universal interest.34 In effect, the ideology of (American) liberalism goes even deeper: the presumption that liberal values are self-evidently true underscores the possibility that other societies could be more like America in practice given the proper incentives or tutelage. Hence the familiar spectacle of American presidents making appearances in foreign countries and pressing those countries to enact such liberal social institutions as a free market economy, the separation of church and state, and increased freedom of the press. While non-Americans resent such actions, in the United States, they are usually seen as the simple reaffirmation of things that Americans know to be true. America imagines the rest of the world as somehow, at base, just like America – if not for the distortion produced by ideology, corrupt regimes, and the historical effects of culture.35 It is in this American liberal ideological discourse that America acquires the status of a universal symbol for its values and its democratic system. The metaphorical global war on terror waged in the name of liberty and civilization delves into the same logic: ‘To say that by attacking the United States the terrorists attacked the world is to suggest that America is the world – or, at least, is what the rest of the world aspires to become.’36 As stated by many scholars of American nationalism, the Bush administration’s ambitious vision for America’s role in the world is reminiscent of earlier moralistic statements of the antebellum period in US political history.37 The post-9/11 era allowed it to reinvigorate the national security discourse with its manifest destiny and a sense of its exceptionalist mission of democratizing the world. Revealed most importantly by the neoconservative guise of US nationalism and liberal ideology, the Global War on Terror has been fuelled by an extremely vibrant and patriotic nationalist base that truly believes that America is invested with a providential mission and sense of moral crusade. This emanates from what Daniel Nexon and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson call the ‘liberal imagination’ in American political life, a powerful identity and ideological narrative in the American discourse on foreign policy which makes them overtly moralistic. It is often used to conflate the US and the world in the protection of liberal democracy and liberty.38 It is however known that the suffusion of liberal values and ascription of a divine mission for the world bring about contradictions when confronted with some of the foreign policy actions of the United States. But this is of no concern for US nationalism; it is committed to an ‘ideological construction of the nation that insists on the global relevance of the American project’ and consequently claims ‘its righteous entitlement to lead the world’.39 This remapping of US nationalism is thus to be understood through a dialectical relationship of exceptionalism/universalism, and of a ‘city upon a hill’/ crusader state. It is in this framing of US globalist nationalism that its neoliberal hegemonic global strategy tries to have it both ways, to remake the world in America’s image, while assuming that its national interests are global interests, thereby conflating its national security with global security, as if the great aspirations of the US and of mankind were one and the same. In this light, the US–led Global War on Terror really becomes a nation-building project that has evolved into sort of a ‘Global Leviathan’, without its mandatory ‘social contract’ with the peoples of the world.40 Neoliberal Geopolitics as American Hegemony – and Informal Imperialism All the fuss with empire/hegemony would not be as present and overwhelming if it were not for the neoconservative influence in the Bush administration. Does speaking of an American empire help us understand the reworking and transformations of American power that resulted from the Bush doctrine and the rising influence of neoconservatism in American politics? Maybe so, maybe not, but the imperial trope has been reactivated by self-declared neoconservatives and, on their own did they couch an argument for a better and stronger America in a ‘New Rome’ project, a Pax Americana for the 21st century.41 Therefore, saying that things have changed since George W. Bush took office is a truism. We now need to consider the neoconservative fantasies of empire.42 Moreover, it is happening in a country where the orthodox discourse has always maintained that there was no such thing as an American Empire. However, if some would like to make us believe that there is such a clashin US foreign policy community that we might speak of a ‘revolution in foreign policy’,43 in many ways it could rather be cast as an evolution, if not an extension of the long-standing neoliberal global strategy set forth for the 1945 post-war era and established within the Cold War’s epithet, the ‘national security state’.44 In highlighting a continuous trend, this does not mean that one believes that a rational project of a clear and well-designed foreign policy has been animating and driving US decision makers from 1945 onwards, but rather that there is some form of consensus on what US national interests and its national security objectives are (amongst decision makers and political and business elites). The conditions within which these objectives are put forth have changed, but the main principles of the strategy have not. Anyone interested in understanding the principles of neoliberal hegemony in US national security conduct since WWII cannot see the Bush foreign policy as a historical anomaly. In this very sense, one may say that the Bush doctrine represents an extreme version of the logic of US national security since WWII.45 For neoconservatives, this military supremacy serves the interests of preserving the long-established hegemony. Even if the 2003 Iraqi War was not a public diplomatic success when we factor in the failure of the Bush administration to persuade a wide international audience of the legitimacy of its policies, there continues to be wide support for the promise of American values and ideals abroad.46 At no point did neoconservatives reject the Cold War strategy, as their target was always the Clinton administration, which they usually criticize for having failed on capitalizing on the ‘peace dividends’ of the fall of communism at the end of the Cold War and for letting new challenges and threats emerge. Maybe it is differences that matter most, but it remains to be seen whether the neoconservatives were so revolutionary as to change US global strategy to bring its long-held hegemony to the ground. In contrast to what many observers and theoreticians assert, it still consists of a mix of a realism associated with fighting a ‘foreign’ threat (from Soviet communism to global terrorism), of a liberalism associated with financial international institutions and multilateral institutions such as the UN and NATO, and a commitment to free market ideology and the promotion of democracy. Today’s American global strategy still refers to the US neoliberal hegemony established after 1945. In that regard, the discourse of a benign American hegemony and its associated neoliberal values of free market, freedom and democracy remain powerful ideas outside the United States. As political geographer Matthew Sparke argues, the differences in foreign policy are not as far off as is alleged by both sides and should probably rather be seen as two opposite sides of a coin: ‘If we instead see the war planning and resulting talk as a complicit mix of geopolitical affect and geoeconomic assumptions, such contradictions becomes comprehensible as the contradictions of an informal American imperialism being pushed in the direction of formality and force amid globalized capitalist interdependency.’47 If one chooses to speak of American unipolarity and interprets American military global power as ‘one of the great realities of our age’ and as a producer of world order, indeed in going as far as to say that ‘never before has one country been so powerful or unrivaled’,48 what prevents a person from acknowledging an American empire/imperialism? For such a person, John Ikenberry for instance, it is the kind of world order sought in principle by the US that prevents any mention of ‘imperialism’. The mere mention of empire as applied to what he sees as hegemonic power from the US comes as a cursory and sketchy rendering. For them, it makes no sense not to refer to our current era as unipolar and any talk that interprets it as being imperial for one ‘[sees] the United States as an imperial power’ is read as unsound.49 Since 9/11 and due to the rising influence of neoconservative ideologues in the Bush cabinet, Ikenberry fears that the imperial logic threatens the post-war American-led hegemonic order that has supposedly worked ‘around open markets, security alliances, multilateral cooperation, and democratic community’.50 From World War II onwards, Ikenberry depicts the Cold War US national security state as having stopped short of any imperial endeavours. For him, talk of empire in the US national experience goes back to the Philippines and the like, to 1898. Hegemony is a better concept to account for ‘the construction of a rule-based international order’. In fact, neoliberal American hegemony was an open and democratic order premised on rules, institutions and partnerships which have had ‘an unprecedented array of partnerships spread across global and regional security, economic, and political realms.’51 Matthew Sparke characterizes an informal American imperialism as the geoeconomical and geopolitical logic of American hegemonic power in the global capitalist system reaffirmed after 1945.52 It is through these neoliberal geopolitics – of American hegemony – that American informal imperialism could last, if not be reinforced.53 For Sparke, if this understanding of hegemony – which he does not dispute but interprets as a form of informal imperialism – has been so powerful in American political science as well as in policymaking circles over the past sixty years, it is more a reflection of the pervasiveness of the ‘liberal tradition in America’ that goes hand in hand with the exceptionalist narrative and with the Cold War context of fighting Soviet communism and reading Marxist theorizing as product or advocacy of the USSR. It is a sign of the exceptionalist roots of this rhetoric of denial of imperialism that by choosing to focus on the depiction of the war in Iraq as an aggressive attempt at American empire-building it is defused from recognizing that this war ‘... has thematized and thereby also compromised the much more enduring and informal form of market-mediated American hegemony’.54 One could therefore argue, as many (Walter Russell Mead for instance55) now do, that the US is a ‘liberal empire’; that in some encompassing ways American (neo)liberal hegemony is a form of imperialism, albeit an informal one. The ‘(neo)liberal hegemony’ thesis may well be the best way to capture the US today, on the longue durée and in its present conjuncture. Others will rather opt for the liberal empire idea, for it allows more the exposition of the contradictions of the US state building and expansionist enterprise. All of this is to say that it becomes crucial to see US nationalism through its many different yet coexisting faces if one wishes to understand how US (neo)liberal ideology permeates US state governmentality.56 The Global War on Terror as Fantasies of an Empire of Security Following the collapse of communism, American strategists were at loose ends in grappling with the development of a coherent security policy. While few, even in those years of confusion, really doubted that America constituted the core of a global system that was characterized by its hegemony, the shock of 11 September concentrated minds. So something was added to the regnant assumption: neoconservative analysts could now trumpet a new-found political will intended to translate the vision of global dominance into reality. With the obvious evidence of American vulnerability, it became easy to legitimize a course of action that, absent the terrorist attacks on the country, would have smacked of old-fashioned imperialism. The clearest expression of this new will to power was found in the national strategy document unveiled in September 2002, and especially in the passages relating to preventive war. According to the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), US military power must be ready to serve at any time if it is to have an impact. Both documents explicitly describe that the US will not only lead but dominate the strategically the world in trying to reach a ‘full spectrum dominance across the range of military operations’.57 The US makes no attempt at dissimulating its global strategy in its self-declared Global War on Terror (GWOT). Its military might is there to maintain unilateral global dominance and hegemony by having the infinite possibility of waging war. Over what interests and values would this GWOT be fought? The answer to this question directly concerns the influence of neocons in US national security conduct.58 At the turn of the millennium, influential neoconservative ideologues, figures like Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, Richard Perle, Stephen Hadley, Robert Kagan, and Irving and William Kristol, thought it was more than time for a more coherent, morally grounded, martial projection of US power falling under the auspices of a liberal benevolent empire using America’s ‘benign hegemony’ to spread democracy rather than just extend the range of the free market.59 In the first Bush administration, these neoconservative figures insisted that the US wanted to shape the world. They wanted ‘an America that was genuinely imperial ... not only because they believed it would make the world better, but because they wanted to see the United States make the world’.60 It comes as no surprise then that one of the main organizations associated with neoconservatives is literally called the Project for a New American Century. If we are to believe US decision makers and neoconservative analysts, the US should be ready to deploy a ‘democratic realism’ in its national security conduct, a powerful rhetoric that reinstates the American commitment to an empire of liberty and of democracy. The axiom of democratic realism stipulates that the United States ‘will support democracy everywhere, but we will commit blood and treasure only in places where there is a strategic necessity – meaning, places central to the larger war against the existential enemy, the enemy that poses a global mortal threat to freedom’.61 How this would strategically translate is still fuzzy though. In so many ways this ‘empire of liberty’ evoked the idea of an ‘empire of security’.62 There is but a thin line separating hegemony from empire, and the former can easily become imperilled by the latter, with its stress upon militarism, arrogance, and above all, the growing threat to employ force. In effect, as Americanist Kousar Azam aptly puts it, ‘The ethos of enlightenment that went into the foundational principles of the USA and promised mankind “an empire of liberty” is seldom reflected in US policies. The fractured discourses of American exceptionalism do not even promise that empire. On the contrary, the USA evokes the chimera of the return of empire that threatens to negate the notion of liberty and destroy in the process the very idea of sovereignty that makes liberty the basis of all civilized existence.’63

#### Economic security causes global violence

NEOCLEOUS ‘8 - Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (Mark, “Critique of Security.” Pg. 95-102)

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent commented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 major covert operations and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. This is security as the slaughter bench of history. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twenty ﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United States in September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111 Economic security (that is, ‘capitalist accumulation’) in the guise of ‘national security’ is now used as the justiﬁcation for all kinds of ‘intervention’, still conducted where necessary in alliance with fascists, gangsters and drug cartels, and the proliferation of ‘national security’ type regimes has been the result. So while the national security state was in one sense a structural bi-product of the US’s place in global capitalism, it was also vital to the fabrication of an international order founded on the power of capital. National security, in effect, became the perfect strategic tool for landscaping the human garden.112 This was to also have huge domestic consequences, as the idea of containment would also come to reshape the American social order, helping fabricate a security apparatus intimately bound up with national identity and thus the politics of loyalty.